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 This thesis analyzes the current model of European Union conditionality toward the 
Western Balkans, which based on a dual approach through the Stabilization and Association 
Process (SAP). Through SAP, the European Union (EU) is trying to stabilize the Western 
Balkans, while at the same time associating them with EU policies and supporting them in taking 
over the EU acquis. My hypothesis is that in order to promote democracy and the rule of law, the 
EU’s policy of stabilizing and integrating should be reformed to better strengthen and clarify 
conditionality.  
In order to test my hypothesis, I focused on the three Western Balkan countries, Croatia, 
Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were chosen because each represented a different 
stage of accession; they share a geographical footprint; and many historical experiences. I first 
discussed problems associated with each country’s transition to democracy. I looked at the 
justice and home affairs sector of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). Within that 
I assessed whether the measures to address corruption and minority rights and refugees have 
been effective.  
The results of my tests indicate that despite the financial assistance the EU has given 
towards the Western Balkans, the countries have a long way to go to improving democracy and 
the rule of law. Conditions have not worsened but they have not improved. The EU can get its 
enlargement policy toward the Western Balkans back on track by strengthening its conditionality 
and only accepting members when they are politically and technically ready to become EU 
member states.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 More than twenty years after declaring its independence from the former Yugoslavia, 
Croatia took a historic step by signing the European Accession Treaty on December 9, 2011, 
making it the twenty-eighth member of the European Union (EU), as of mid 2013. Croatia will 
become the EU’s second ex-Yugoslav member, after Slovenia.1 
 Further pushing Croatia towards the EU, on January 22, 2012, Croatians voted in favor of 
EU membership in a national referendum. Voters were asked a simple question, “Do you support 
the Republic of Croatia’s membership of the European Union?”2 Sixty-five percent voted in 
favor of membership versus thirty-three percent against.3 Praising the result, European 
Commission president José Barroso, and European Council President Herman Van Rompuy, 
issued a press statement calling the upcoming accession of Croatia a “positive outcome.”4 “The 
upcoming accession of Croatia sends a clear signal to the whole region of South Eastern Europe. 
It shows that through political courage and determined reforms, EU membership is within 
reach,” they said.5 
 While this new development might paint European accession in a rosy light, all is not 
quiet on the Western Front. Voter turnout in the referendum was about forty-four percent.6 
Minister of Parliament (MP) Ruza Tomasic said, “We are not ready for the European Union. We 
should have improved our economy, increased our exports, and only join then. Our economy is 
                                                 
1 "Croatia Signs Treaty to Join EU in Middle of 2013." BBC News. BBC, 9 Dec. 2011. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16106982> 
2 "Croatia EU Referendum: Voters Back Membership." BBC News. BBC, 22 Jan. 2012. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16670298> 
3 Ibid. 
4Joint Statement of European Commission President Barroso and European Council President Van Rompuy on the 
Outcome of the EU Accession Referendum in Croatia. EUROPA. 22 Jan. 2012. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/12/29&format=HTML&ag> 
5 Ibid. 
6 "Croatia Votes for EU Membership." Euronews. 22 Jan. 2012. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://www.euronews.com/2012/01/22/croatia-votes-for-eu-membership> 
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in very bad condition. We don’t have a single real national bank. Our exports are abysmal. We 
are on our knees.”7 While these words are stark, the numbers confirm the statements of Ms. 
Tomasic and others in the “No” camp. Croatia’s economy is sluggish, with a growth rate of just 
0.4 percent and a debt higher than its income at 102 percent of its GDP as of January 2012.8 The 
unemployment rate is around eighteen percent and the average salary is equivalent to €715 or 
$944.9 Given these alarming numbers, it remains to be seen whether Croatians will still accept 
restructuring willingly. 
 Croatia’s accession to the EU represents the dilemma of European enlargement in the 
Western Balkans.10 On the one hand, enlargement will bring about better market access, more 
trade and investment opportunities, and security. The EU promises to transform the Western 
Balkans into stable, self sufficient democracies, at peace with themselves and their neighbors, 
with market economies and rule of law.11 On the other hand, should the Western Balkans join a 
community in the midst of severe economic problems? The EU’s policy towards the Balkans has 
had mixed results. From Greece’s name dispute with Macedonia to European divisions over 
recognizing Kosovo, to arguments over whether Serbia is cooperating with the Hague Tribunal, 
the EU’s policy towards the Western Balkans is in disarray.12  
                                                 




10 The Balkan Peninsula is best defined as an area of southeastern Europe surrounded by water on three sides: the 
Adriatic Sea to the west, the Mediterranean Sea to the South and the Black Sea to the east. Its northern boundary is 
given as the Danube, Sava, and Kupa rivers. The countries that fall within this area are: Albania, Bosnia, and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and Montenegro. 
Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia are significantly located on the peninsula and are considered part of the Balkans. For 
this thesis, we will be looking at the Western Balkan countries. The European Commission defines the Western 
Balkans as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia, and Kosovo.  
11 AroldaElbasani. "EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans: Strategies of Borrowing and Investing." Journal of 
Southern Europe and the Balkans 10.3 (2008): 293-307 p. 293 
12Kristof Bender, and Gearld Knaus. High Soon in Slovenia-a Referendum and the Future of Balkan Enlargement. 
European Stability Initiative, 2010. 
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 The European Economic Community Treaty (EEC) or the Treaty of Rome, signed in 
1957, evoked the aim “of creating an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe.”13 It 
omitted, however, that becoming a closer union on the inside simultaneously implies becoming a 
closed union on the outside. This is the dilemma of European integration, which contains both 
dimensions of inclusion and exclusion.  
 If a country wants to join the European Union, it must fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria. 
The criteria were drawn up in 1993 for the newly independent Central and Eastern European 
countries whose transition to democracy and capitalism became synonymous with transition to 
EU membership.14 Countries must meet certain political and economic preconditions, have to be 
able to adopt the full body of EU law, and need to obtain the EU’s political consent to initiate the 
accession process.15 The fundamental precondition for membership, however, is a “European 
identity.” As the Treaty on the European Union states: “Any European State […] may apply to 
become a member of the Union.”16 
 If the EU does not recognize the interested country as “European,” it does not need to 
apply any other criteria, as was the case when it rejected Morocco’s application in 1987.17 While 
there is no dispute that the Western Balkans are in Europe, they are a hard nut for the EU to 
crack. Not only do the countries of the region need to undergo the triple transition of 
democratization, marketization, and state consolidation, which the Central and Eastern European 
                                                 
13 The Treaty of Rome. EUROPA. Web. 25 Apr. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf> 
14 Desmond Dinan. "Beyond the EU's Borders." Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration. 4th 
ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2011. 483-527.  p.485 
15Marcel Viëtor. "Putting the Neighborhood on the Map: Ever Closer, Ever Closed? Enlargement, Neighborhood, 
and the Question of "European Identity." Ed. Almut Möller. DGAP Analyse: Crossing Borders: Rethinking the 
European Union's Neighborhood Policies 2 (2011): 11-15. p. 11 
16 Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union. EUROPA. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002M/htm/C_2002325EN.000501.html#anArt59>. 
17 Marcel Viëtor. "Putting the Neighborhood on the Map: Ever Closer, Ever Closed? Enlargement, Neighborhood, 
and the Question of "European Identity p. 11  
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Countries (CEE) faced following the changes in 1989, they also face the legacy of wars of the 
1990s.18 The breakup of Yugoslavia remains a heavy burden upon relations between the 
successor states and has required sustained state and nation-building efforts throughout the 
region.  
 This thesis will analyze the current European model, which is based on a dual approach 
through the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). SAP has three aims: 
1. Stabilizing the countries and encouraging their swift transition to a market economy; 
2. Promoting regional cooperation; 
3. Eventual membership of the EU.19 
Through SAP, the EU is trying to stabilize the Western Balkans, while at the same time 
associating them with EU policies and supporting them in taking over the EU acquis. This 
approach draws not only on the ordinary toolkit of enlargement policy, but makes use of a series 
of instruments pertaining to foreign policy as personified in the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and its operational arm, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).20  
I will argue that the SAP or dual approach model of stabilizing and integrating to 
promote democracy and the rule of law in the case of the Western Balkans is ineffective. The 
model needs to be clearer and more consistent. The EU must do a better job of increasing the 
internal coherence of its policies in the region. They must better communicate the conditions and 
benefits of accession by having a consistent message, clarifying the criteria of accession. While 
                                                 
18Natasha Wunsch. "Reaching Its Limits? EU Enlargement Policy in the Western Balkans." Ed. Almut 
Möller. DGAP Analyse: Crossing Borders: Rethinking the European Union's Neighborhood Policies 2: 25-29. p. 25 
19"The Stabilization and Association Process." European Commission-Enlargement. EUROPA, 20 Apr. 2012. Web. 
15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/ind
ex_en.htm> 
20Natasha Wunsch. "Reaching Its Limits? EU Enlargement Policy in the Western Balkans p. 25 
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the future of the Balkans and the rest of Europe is interdependent, the current model is 
unproductive and producing very sluggish results.  
 The EU’s credibility as an international actor depends to some degree on its success in 
the Western Balkans because the Western Balkan enlargement is a major test case for EU foreign 
policy. In no other region in Europe are the incentives for transformation so significant. Thus, the 
failure to successfully integrate all the Western Balkan States would have an impact and would 
damage the EU’s claim to act as a transformative power in its neighborhood. This thesis aims to 
provide policymakers, practitioners, and the public with fresh ideas on how the Western Balkans 
















Chapter 2: Research Design 
My hypothesis is that in order to promote democracy and the rule of law, the European 
Union policy of stabilizing and integrating should be reformed to better strengthen and clarify 
conditionality. 
I plan to apply this hypothesis to the specific case of the Western Balkans, that is Croatia, 
Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. These three cases have been chosen because each 
represents a different stage of accession. Croatia signed its Accession Treaty on December 9, 
2012 with the European Council.1 Subject to ratification of the Treaty by Croatia and all Member 
States, Croatia will become an EU Member State on July 1, 2013.2 Serbia became an EU 
candidate country on March 1, 2012 after the European Council endorsed their conclusions of 
February 28, 2012 on the Enlargement and the Stabilization and Association Process.3 Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is still progressing towards becoming a candidate country but its deteriorating 
political situation makes Bosnia and Herzegovina’s enlargement bid uncertain.4 In addition, all 
three states share a geographical footprint and many historical experiences. They were all 
principal actors in the wars in Yugoslavia and faced/face challenges stemming from efforts to 
change political attitudes and chart a new course towards a more productive future.5 
I will focus on the transition to democracy as well as the justice and home affairs sector 
of the Instruments for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), which is a particular element, in 
measuring the effectiveness of EU methods. The IPA has five components: Transition Assistance 
                                                 
1 General Secretariat of the Council. European Council-9 December 2011-conclusions. EUROPA, 25 Jan. 2012. 
Web. 15 Mar. 2012. <http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/126714.pdf> p. 5 
2 Ibid. p. 5 
3 General Secretariat of the Council. European Council-1/2 March-Conclusions. EUROPA, 28 Mar. 2012. Web. 15 
Mar. 2012. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/128520.pdf>. 
4 Report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Activities of the 
European Union Military Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Rep. no. S/2011/717. United Nations. Web. 15 Mar. 
2012. <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/592/73/PDF/N1159273.pdf?OpenElement> p. 3 
5Richard P Farkas. Democratization in the Balkans: Prescription for a Badly Scarred Body Politic. Boston: 
Northeastern UP, 2007. p.4  
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and Institution Building, Cross-Border Cooperation, Regional Development, Human Resources 
Development, and Rural Development. However, in the interest of time, I will be looking closely 
at only the first component which is used to strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of 
law. Within this first component, there are seven sectoral foci. They are: justice and home affairs 
and fundamental rights; public administration reform; environment and climate change; 
transports; private sector development; social development; and agriculture and rural 
developments. Again in the interest of time, I will be looking only at the justice and home affairs 
sector within that I will also assess whether the measures undertaken to address corruption and 
minority rights and refugees have been effective, that is whether the step by step goals are being 
met. By that I mean whether there have been positive changes in the areas of corruption and 
minority rights and refugees.  
Before going into the literature relevant to this study, it is important to define two terms, 
“Europeanization” and “democracy.” 
Europeanization  
Throughout modern history, Europeanization has taken on different meanings. It has 
referred to the process of socialization or the internalization of EU norms.6 It is used in this way 
by historians and anthropologists to describe the export of cultural norms and patterns. Today, 
Europeanization is associated with the domestic adaption to the pressures resulting directly or 
indirectly from EU membership. It is used to show how public administrative institutions have 
adapted to the obligations of EU membership.7  
                                                 
6Adrienne Héritier. "Europeanization Research East and West: A Comparative Assessment."The Europeanization of 
Central and Eastern Europe. Ed. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2005. p. 
202 
7 Ibid. p. 202 
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Many researchers have used Europeanization in a variety of ways. A common usage was 
first provided by Robert Ladrech in his 1994 article “The Europeanization of Domestic Politics 
and Institutions: the Case of France.”8 He saw Europeanization as a process reorienting the 
direction and shape of politics to the degree that the European Community’s political and 
economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy 
making.9 This concept focuses on how actors redefine their interests and behavior to meet the 
rules, norms, and logic of EU membership.  
Looking at the institutional sphere, Caporaso, Cowles, and Risse suggest that 
Europeanization should be a dual product of adaptational pressures resulting from varying 
goodness of fit between EU and national institutions and policies and domestic intervening 
variables, including the number of veto points and the organizational and political cultures 
embedded in existing national institutions.10 Their focus is on cross-level political interactions.  
In contrast, Knills and Lehmkuhl focus on a top-down approach. Each mechanism 
involves policy constraints emanating from the European level that may yield domestic 
institutional changes.11 The first mechanism takes the form of “positive integration” and is found 
when EU obligations advise an institutional model to which domestic arrangements have to be 
adopted, with little national discretion.12 In this context, Europeanization rests on institutional 
goodness of fit between domestic and European arrangements.13 The second mechanism is called 
“negative integration” and occurs when EU legislation changes the domestic rules of the game. 
                                                 
8Robert Ladrech. "The Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France." Journal of 
Common Market Studies 32.1 (1994): 69-88. p. 69 
9 Ibid. p. 69 
10Mark A Pollack. "Theorizing EU Policy-Making." Policy-making in the European Union. Ed. Helen Wallace, 
Mark A. Pollack, and Alasdair R. Young. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010. 15-44  p. 37 
11Kevin Featherstone. "Introduction: In the Name of "Europe"" The Politics of Europeanization. Ed. Kevin 
Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003. 3-26 p. 14 
12Christopher Knill, and Dirk Lehmkuhl. "How Europe Matters: Different Mechanisms of 
Europeanization." European Integration Online Papers 3.7 (1999) p. 3 
13 Featherstone, Kevin. "Introduction: In the Name of "Europe" p. 14 
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Finally, the third mechanism is whether European policy changes the beliefs and expectations of 
domestic actors, who in turn may change their preferences and strategies.14 
For this thesis, I define Europeanization as a process in which states adapt to EU rules for 
enlargement. When I refer to “states,” I denote the political-institutional structures into which 
EU rules are integrated. “Governments” are the actors that adopt the EU rules. The rules cover a 
broad range of issues and structures, such as regulation and distribution in specific policy areas, 
political and administrative processes, and the creation and competences of state and sub-state 
organizations.15 Government works to institutionalize and implement EU rules at the domestic 
level.  
Democracy  
 The term “democracy” is something we hear a lot but often do not usually clarify. In the 
European Union Treaty, Article 6 states, “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles 
which are common to the Member States.”16 But what actually is “democracy”?  
 According to James Coporaso, democracy is a set of procedures about how collective 
decisions are taken. Collective decisions are made by all the relevant actors.17 In this definition, 
democracy means that people choose those who make the decisions and the procedures by which 
these decisions are made.  
Seymour Martin Lipset defines democracy as a “political system which provides regular 
constitutional opportunities for changing government officials… [and] permits the largest 
                                                 
14 Chrisstopher Knill, and Dirk Lehmkuhl. "How Europe Matters: Different Mechanisms of Europeanization." P. 3 
15Frank Schimmelfennig, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. "Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and 
Eastern Europe." The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. Ed. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich 
Sedelmeier. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2005. 1-28. p. 7 
16 Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union. EUROPA 
17James A Caporaso. The European Union: Dilemmas of Regional Integration. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000. p. 43 
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possible part of the population to influence decisions through their ability to choose among 
alternative contenders for political office.”18 Samuel Huntington defines democracy as the extent 
to which collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in 
which candidates freely compete for votes and the entire adult population is eligible to vote.19 
For Charles Beitz, democracy is conceived as “a kind of rivalry for control over the state’s 
policy-making apparatus, with an electoral mechanism at its center in which all citizens are 
entitled to participate…The generic idea of democracy is indeterminate about these matters, but 
because not all the possibilities are equally acceptable, some criterion is needed for selecting 
among them.20 Finally, Elmer Schattschnedier defines democracy as a “competitive political 
system in which competing leaders and organizations define the alternatives of public policy in 
such a way that the public can participate in the decision-making process.”21 
In addition to defining democracy in terms of elections and representation, there are other 
definitions that look at democracy through the specter of governance. Governance in its most 
fundamental sense implies the capacity of a society to develop some means of making and 
implementing collective choices. The logic of the governance concept is that an effective society 
requires some set of mechanisms for identifying common problems, deciding upon goals, and 
then designing and implementing the means to achieve those purposes.22 One aspect of 
governance is good governance, which has eight major characteristics. Good governance is 
participatory, consensus orientated, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, 
                                                 
18Seymour Martin Lipset. Political Man. London: Mercury, 1963 p. 71 
19Samuel P Huntington. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of 
Oklahoma, 1991. p. 7 
20Andreas Follesdal, and Simon Hix. "Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and 
Moravcsik." Journal of Common Market Studies 44.3 (2006): 533-62. p. 547  
21 Ibid. p. 547 
22 B. Guy Peters, and Jon Pierre. "Governance Approaches." European Integration Theory. By Antje Wiener and 
Thomas Diez. Second ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009. 91-104 p. 92 
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equitable and inclusive and inclusive, and follows the rule of law. It assures that corruption is 
minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account in decision-making, and responsive to 
the present and future needs of society.23 
Kaufmann defines good governance as “the traditions and institutions by which authority 
in a country is exercised.”24 This includes; a process by which governments are selected, 
monitored, and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement 
sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic 
and social interactions among them.25 
Huther and Shah define good governance as a “multifaceted concept encompassing all 
aspects of the exercise of authority though formal and informal institutions in the management of 
the resource endowment of a state. The quality of governance is thus determined by the impact 
of this exercise of power on the quality of life enjoyed by its citizens.”26  
Finally, the World Bank defines good governance as the manner in which power is 
exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources.27 
In this thesis I will define democracy broadly as a political system that focuses on 
effective and accountable institutions, the electoral process, representation, and responsible 
structures of government, in order to ensure an open and legitimate relationship between the state 
and its citizens. 
 
 
                                                 
23 "What Is Good Governance?" United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific. United 
Nations. Web. 1 May 2012. <http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp>. 
24Bo Rothstein, and Jan Teorell. "What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government 
Institutions." Governance 21.2 (2008): 165-90. p. 168 
25 Ibid. p. 168 
26 Ibid. p. 169 
27 Weiss, Thomas G. "Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual 
Challenges." Third World Quarterly 21.5 (2000): 795-814. p. 797 
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Integration Theory 
 In explaining European enlargement, the main explanatory framework is integration 
theory. Integration theory has evolved over time. In the 1940s and 1950s, the prominent theories 
were federalism and functionalism. Following World War II, two paths towards European 
integration were laid out; one an integrated European federal union modeled on the United States 
(federalism); the other international functional cooperation, in which states would build 
foundations for peace and security by cooperating with one another (functionalism).28 Building 
on the tenets of functionalism, in the 1960s to the 1980s, neofunctionalists and 
intergovernmentalists argued that what drove functional cooperation was key interest groups 
which favored integration and governments that pursued national interests.29 Since the 1990s, a 
new crop of theories have emerged, including multilevel governance and constructivism. For 
each theory, I will explain their main arguments and theorists, and how it helps explain European 
enlargement over time.  
 Federalism has its roots in the Latin term foedus, meaning covenant. 30 It is based on the 
idea that you can bring together previously separate, autonomous, or independent entities into a 
union whose purpose is to recognize, preserve, and accommodate distinct interests, identities, 
and cultures. The meaning of foedus constituted the first serious challenge to the famous French 
philosopher, Jean Bodin, and his conception of the state in his 1576 work, “Les Six Livres de la 
Republique.”31 Bodin believed in the notion of an independent sovereign state as centralized, 
absolute, and indivisible with a supreme power resident (king) answerable only to God and 
                                                 
28Roy H Ginsberg. Demystifying the European Union: The Enduring Logic of Regional Integration. 2nd ed. New 
York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010 p. 65 
29 Ibid. p. 65 
30 "Foedus." Babylon.com. Latin-English Online Dictionary. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://www.babylon.com/define/112/Latin-Dictionary.html> 
31Micheal Burgess. "Federalism." European Integration Theory: Second Edition. By Antje Wiener and Thomas 
Diez. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009. p. 27  
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natural law. In addition, according to Baruch Spinoza, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, 
and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, all states are legally equal, that is all states have the same 
juridical status.32  
The Bodinian model of the state was first challenged by German Calvinist intellectual 
and political magistrate Johannes Althusius, in his 1603 work, “Politica Methodice Digesta 
(known as the Politics).33 It articulated a set of federal principles as the basis for the modern 
state. Althusius is seen as the father of modern federalism.  
 In the context of the EU, federalism promotes the idea of a voluntary union of states and 
people that is binding upon its members and rooted in mutual respect, recognition, reciprocity, 
tolerance, consent, and equality.34 Its shape and structure are determined by the declared goals of 
the covenant and the historical circumstances that created it. Since integration, not assimilation, 
is the main goal of the EU, it was founded on both self and shared rule.35 
 The modern origins of the European federalist movement are to be found in the threat of 
war and the practical experience of World War II. One of the most prominent federalists was 
Altierto Spinelli. Spinelli’s strategy for a European Federation called for creating political 
institutions that would be quickly translated into a constitution. His argument can be boiled down 
to three themes. First, he believed in an autonomous European federation. The federation must 
not be a political party but rather it should be an organization aimed at uniting all supporters of a 
European federation regardless of their political beliefs or social background. The organization 
must be supranational in nature so as to instill loyalty in its supporters and enable them to 
                                                 
32Patrick Riley. "The Origins of Federal Theory in International Relations Ideas." Polity 7.1 (1973): 87-121. JSTOR. 
Web. 22 Apr. 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3234183> p. 105 
33Micheal Burgess. "Federalism.” p. 28 
34Ibid. p. 30 
35Ibid. p. 30 
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organize political action at a European level.36 Finally, the movement must have a direct 
influence on public opinion, outside of national electoral campaigns, which would help them 
exert pressure on the European policies of governments.  
 The second theme of Spinelli’s strategy was the concept of a European constituent 
assembly. He believed that the biggest obstacle to the federation movement was the European 
governments themselves, which were afraid to give up their power. European institutions, he 
argued, cannot bring about federal solutions because national governments will try to maintain 
absolute sovereignty at the expense of effective unification. 37 A constituent assembly, composed 
of people representing public opinion, would be more favorable toward federal institutions for 
three reasons. First, if the majority of the public supports unification, their representatives have 
to take this into account. Second, the political parties would have an international orientation and 
would thus support the creation of transnational groups within a European assembly working 
together to strengthen pro-European attitudes. Finally, those representing public opinion would 
not hold positions of power which are directly dependent on the continuance of absolute national 
sovereignty.38 
 Spinelli’s model for a constituent assembly was the United States Constitution. The 
Philadelphia Convention, which framed the Constitution, contains three elements that Spinelli 
says should be used for a creation of a European Constitution. First, the governments of 
individual states should have the responsibility for starting the process by giving the convention 
authority, but afterward should refrain from interfering in its deliberations. Second, the 
convention must act by majority vote. Third, the ratification of the Constitution should be 
                                                 
36Sergio Pistone. "Altiero Spinelli and the Strategy for the United States of Europe." The European Union Readings 
on the Theory and Practice of European Integration. Ed. Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander Stubb. Third ed. Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003. 91-98 p. 94  
37 Ibid. p. 95  
38 Ibid. p. 95 
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entrusted to the appropriate constitutional organs of individual states, and come into force once 
ratified by a majority of them.39 
 From a federalist perspective, enlargement would create a problem for a federal Europe. 
The largest concern would be the preservation of unity and diversity in both European 
institutions and policies. Federalists argue that the EU would have to accommodate all of the 
applicants without damaging the already agreed upon norms and rules within the EU.40  
 In contrast to federalists, functionalists believe that technical cooperation among states 
raises human welfare and enhances world peace. National divisions become less important 
relative to the work of international functional bodies. Two of the most prominent theorists of 
functionalism are Jean Monnet and David Mitrany.  
Jean Monnet has been referred to as the “father of Europe.”41 He convinced French 
Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, to propose the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
and became its president from 1951 to 1955. He also led the Europe-wide Action Committee of a 
United States of Europe until 1975.42 Monnet argued that a political strategy of small, concrete, 
economic steps would culminate in a federal Europe. He believed that states should adopt 
common rules governing their behavior and create common institutions to apply these rules.43 
The ECSC perfectly expressed these small economic steps.  
David Mitrany published “A Working Peace System” in 1943, which introduced the 
theory of functionalism. In his study he rejected classical power politics and federalist visions in 
favor of the notion of a working peace system, in which specific areas of human activity, 
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important to welfare, would be organized internationally and managed by experts.44 Rather than 
giving up their sovereignty, Mitrany argued that states should share it.45 Functional integration 
would be rational, pragmatic, technocratic, and flexible. It would blur national and international, 
public and private, and political and nonpolitical distinctions.46 
 Federalists such as Spinelli criticized functionalism for its belief that one can integrate 
selected sectors of national activity without a federalist constitutional framework. They argued 
that by refusing to start with a supranational authority, the principle of a national veto would be 
retained. Thus, European institutions would be deprived of their ability to overcome special 
interests that arise from unrestrained national sovereignty.47 In addition, chaos and inefficiency 
would be a product of a lack of common management of the interdependent economies of 
modern states. 
 An updated form of functionalism, neofunctionalism, was formulated in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, mainly through the work of Ernest Haas and Leon Lindberg in response to the 
creation of the ECSC and the European Economic Community (EEC). It finds its intellectual 
roots at the juncture between functionalists, federalists, and communication theories, while 
drawing indirectly upon the “group theorists” of American politics.48 Neofunctionalism differs 
from functionalism because while functionalists hold that form, scope, and the purpose of an 
organization is determined by the task it was designed to fulfill, neofunctionalists attach 
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considerable importance to the autonomous influence of supranational institutions and the 
emergence of organized interests.49   
 Neofunctionalism gave no single authoritative definition of integration. Both Haas and 
Lindberg argued that integration is a process as opposed to an outcome and involves the creation 
and role expansion of regional institutions.50 In addition, they both stressed change in 
expectations and activities on the part of participating actors. While Lindberg limited his study to 
the EEC, Haas based his analysis on the ECSC, but extended his conclusions to both the EEC 
and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).51 In his 1958 book, “The Uniting 
of Europe” Haas defined integration as: 
The process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to 
shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose 
institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end 
result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed 
over the pre-existing ones.52 
 
Lindberg in his 1963 book “The Political Dynamics of European Integration” defines 
integration slightly differently from Haas:  
The process whereby nations forgo the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key 
domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or 
to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs; and the process whereby 
political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and 
political activities to a new center.53 
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Lindberg’s definition can be seen as more cautious than that of Haas. Unlike Haas, he 
does not suggest any endpoint for the integration process. Lindberg also suggested that political 
actors only shift their expectations and not their loyalties to a new centre.54 
 There are five main assumptions of neofunctionalists about the dynamics of 
Europeanization. The first is that actors are rational and self-interested and have the capacity to 
learn and change their preferences. This change of expectations, activities, and loyalties are 
motivated by the actors’ interests.55 They are not constant, however, and are likely to change 
during the integration process as actors learn from the benefits of regional policies and from 
experiences in decision-making. For example, Haas argued that membership in the ECSC altered 
the way that interest groups and, later, member governments, perceived their interests.56 
 Second, once institutions are established, they can take a life on their own and 
progressively escape the control of their creators. Because they want to increase their own 
power, employees of regional institutions become agents of further integration by influencing the 
perception of a participating government’s interest.57  
Third, most political actors are unable to engage in long-term purposive behavior because 
they are driven by the unintended consequences of previous decisions.58 Decisions are 
undertaken with little knowledge of their consequences and decision makers are under constant 
pressure of deadlines. Fourth, neofunctionalists reject the realist notion that all actions between 
actors are zero-sum in nature. Exchanges are better described as positive-sum games under a 
supranational style of decision-making. States refrain from vetoing proposals and instead seek to 
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compromise.59 Fifth, neofunctionalists believe that interdependencies between whole economies 
and their productive sectors tend to foster integration.   
 All five of these assumptions are summed up in the notion of spillover. Haas describes 
spillover as a process in which the integration of one sector leads to the pushing of states to 
integrate into other sectors.60. The spillover process can be split into two key components, the 
sectoral spillover and political spillover. The sectoral spillover involves the expansion of 
integrative activities from one sector to another, for example, moving from coal and steel to 
agriculture. 61 Political spillover means increasing the politicization of sectoral activities, for 
example, when the coordination of monetary policies was replaced by a more centralized system 
of governance.62 
Neofunctionalist theory has been criticized on a number of premises.  First, it has been 
criticized as being too grand in its theoretical assumptions. It cannot provide a general theory of 
regional integration in all settings, especially of its origins.63 Second, liberal interdependence 
theorists such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have questioned neofunctionalists’ assertion 
that spillover is inevitable as well as their dependence on economic determinism. More 
economically minded critics observe that the concept of spillover is connected to the belief that 
economic growth would continue unabated in the capitalist world, and all member states would 
benefit more-or-less equally.64 Finally, neofunctionalists have been criticized for their lack of 
attention to domestic political processes and structures. According to Hansen and George, they 
underestimated the role of national leadership by assuming that they were only “economic 
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incrementalists and welfare seekers.”65 Neofunctionalists have also overestimated the role of 
interest groups in affecting policy.  
For the purpose of this study, neofunctionalism, despite the criticisms, provides relevant 
framework in that EU integration has been deepened across sectors and as a result, new states 
that want to join have to meet sectoral requirements. Integration is a process and enlargement can 
be viewed as another stage in the integration process, that is in the expansion stage (widening 
and deepening).  
Another theory, liberal intergovermentalism (LI) is known as a “baseline theory,” to 
which other integration theories are often compared.66 It rests on two basic assumptions.  First, 
states are actors and can achieve their goals through intergovernmental negotiations and 
bargaining, rather than through a centralized authority creating and enforcing decisions. The first 
assumption differs from realism because national security is not the dominant motivation, state 
power is not based on coercion, state preferences and identities are not identical, and interstate 
institutions are not insignificant.67 Liberal intergovermentalists acknowledge that states in 
institutions such as the EU are in control of their decision-making and political legitimacy. The 
second assumption is that states are rational. Actors will always choose the course of action that 
maximizes their utility under the circumstances. Agreements to cooperate or establish 
international institutions are a collective outcome of interdependent rational state choices and 
intergovernmental negotiations.68  
The prominent author of LI is Andrew Moravcsik. In his book, The Choice of Europe, he 
argued that EU integration is best understood as a series of rational choices made by national 
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leaders. These choices respond to constraints and opportunities coming from three areas: first, 
from the economic interests of powerful domestic constituents; second, from state power 
stemming from asymmetrical interdependence; and finally from the role of institutions in 
bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments.69   
Liberal intergovermentalism is not without its share of critics. Rational-choice 
institutionalists assert that liberal intergovermentalism cannot explain everyday decision-making 
and is limited to only a small sliver of EU policy-making in which institutions plays a small role. 
Historical institutionalists argue that liberal intergovernmentalists only focus on “conscious 
intergovernmental decision-making at treaty-amending moments.” 70 
Another relevant theory is multilevel governance.  Governance implies the capacity of a 
society to develop some means of making and implementing collective choices. An example 
would be the development of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). This mechanism 
involves the member countries creating their own goals and benchmarks for pursuing European 
policies, rather than using the conventional top-down means of goal setting.71 It is part of a 
movement toward new governance in which the tools used to enact public programs are softer 
and based on more negotiation than on the use of authority.  
The idea of multilevel governance was developed in order to understand the 
implementation of European directives. The model recognizes the existence of national 
governments in the EU as well as the importance of regional governments.72 Because it 
empowers and creates regional entities, multi-level governance legitimizes the EU. However, the 
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development of these relationships provides some social and political groups with greater 
influence over the integration process.  
In relation to this study, liberal intergovermentalism is useful in that members will 
calculate the advantages of enlargement in terms of the costs and benefits of socioeconomic 
interdependence. New members want to join the EU on the basis of both domestic and state 
preferences. Meanwhile, existing members have shown variable enthusiasm about welcoming 
new members, again based on their preferences. This has impacted the level of conditionality 
imposed on perspective candidates.  
Finally, multilevel governance is a strategy that explains how the Commission works. 
The EU has little implementation capacity of its own, and thus depends upon the member states 
in order to be able to put policy choices into effect. The assumption is that the directives coming 
from the Commission will be implemented as intended.73 
In the next chapter, we will be looking at the past European enlargements and how they 
have affected the Europeanization of the Western Balkans.  
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Chapter 3: Background on EU Enlargement 
 For more than half a decade, the EU has grown considerably. From six countries in 1951 
(Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands in the European Coal and 
Steel Community, the EU has grown to twenty seven today.1 It has a population close to 500 
million and economically is a superpower that competes with the United States.2 There have 
been five successive enlargements since 1951:  
• 1973: Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the European Community (EC) 
• 1981: Greece joined the EC 
• 1986: Spain and Portugal joined the EC 
• 1995: Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU 
• 2004: In the largest EU enlargement, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the EU 
• 2007: Completing the current enlargement, Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU3 
The procedures for accession into the EU are set out in the Treaty of the European Union in 
articles 6 and 49. They state respectively: 
Article 6 (1)  
The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights 




Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply to 
become a member of the Union. It shall address its application to the Council, which 
shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of 
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the European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of its component 
members. 
The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is 
founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an agreement between the 
Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification 
by all the contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements.5 
 
 Since the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the procedures for accession have remained relatively 
unchanged. The 1987 Single European Act added the requirement that the European 
Parliament’s consent was needed when approving an association agreement during the accession 
process.6 Also, the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam clarified the political conditions by inserting the 
reference to Article 6 which stated the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law which are common to all 
member states.  
Until the 1990s, there appeared no need for an enlargement policy beyond the rules of 
Article 49 and case-by-case bargaining among the member states and between existing members 
and candidate countries. The Iron Curtain prevented one half of Europe from contemplating EU 
membership. The rest of Western Europe was either skeptical about deeper integration or under 
authoritarian regimes. Thus, enlargement was restricted to fairly discrete episodes, and ad hoc 
bargaining.7 
Until the end of the Cold War, the challenge to the European Union became to create an 
enlargement policy that went beyond the traditional procedures for accepting new members. In 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 "The Single European Act." Summaries of EU Legislation. EUROPA, 26 Oct. 2010. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_singleact_en.htm> 
7Ulrich Sedelmeier. "Enlargement: From Rules for Accession to a Policy towards Europe."Policy-making in the 
European Union. Ed. Helen Wallace, Mark A. Pollack, and Alasdair R. Young. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010. 
401-29 p. 405 
28 
other words, the question was how best to manage relations with countries that wanted to join, 
but were not yet ready to enforce the body of EU legislation.8 
A key element in this new policy is how to provide support for the transition to market 
economies and democracy and whether to use the prospect of EU membership to support such 
reforms. The prospect of reforming the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) 
appealed to the EU’s greater foreign policy goal of bringing stability in the European 
neighborhood.9  
In 1989, the EU developed a policy framework that went far beyond the procedures in 
Article 49 of the Treaty. Enlargement policy now comes into play long before a country 
officially applies for membership and accession negotiations are only the final stage in a much 
longer process. The enlargement process can be broken down into three stages: associate 
process; being recognized as a potential candidate country and the development of a policy 
framework for accession; and accession negotiations. During each phase, the EU uses 
conditionality to link progress from one phase to the next until certain conditions are met.10 As of 
March 2012, there are nine countries vying to become EU members. They are all in varying 
degrees of the accession process.  
Croatia is the only acceding country, due to become a member on July 1, 2013.11 Iceland, 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey are all candidate 
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countries.12 Finally, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo under UN Security Council 
resolution 1244 are considered potential candidate countries.13 
A country’s application for membership is no longer the first stage of accession. Until the 
1995 enlargement, the process usually started with an application because countries were mostly 
judged to be already in a position to apply and enforce the acquis (EU laws). There were some 
exceptions in the cases of Greece, Portugal, and Spain. All three shook off right-wing 
dictatorships in the mid-1970s and wanted to join the EU as soon as possible to end their relative 
isolation, stabilize their newly established democracies, and develop their economies. Although 
Greece was able to join within a relatively short time, the accession negotiations with Spain and 
Portugal were long and drawn out.14 Despite the Commission advising against early accession 
for Greece for economic reasons, the Council saw the Greek case from a political perspective 
and disregarded the Commission’s advice.15 Greece became the tenth member of the EC in 
January 1981. The Council saw membership of the European Community as a way to strengthen 
Greece’s democracy and it wanted to ensure stability on its southern border.  
Not wanting to be lumped in with Spain, given that some EC countries feared that 
Spain’s accession would bring negative consequences, Portugal applied to join the EC in March 
1977, more than a year before Spain applied. The Commission identified numerous economic, 
structural, and administrative issues (mainly textiles, migrant workers, fisheries, and agriculture) 
that had to be addressed before they could recommend a timetable for accession.16 Even though 
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Portugal made progress, such as reaching an agreement with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) to restructure the economy, the main point of contention was with regard to agriculture 
and fisheries. Therefore, Spain’s and Portugal’s negotiations became increasingly linked.  
The main opposition to Spain came from France, concerned over the impact of Spanish 
agriculture on the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). Spain’s accession would have increased 
the EC’s agricultural area by thirty percent and farm workforce by twenty-five percent.17 Spain, 
for its part, was unwilling to accept all the obligations of membership, specifically the need to 
launch a value-added tax, curtail subsidies, and curb protectionism. The situation improved when 
the new government of Felipe González, embarked on a goodwill tour to promote Spanish 
accession. Despite this, in a dispute over the Common Fisheries Policy, Spanish fishermen 
attacked foreign trucks and in turn, French truckers blockaded the Spanish border throughout 
1984.18 
The breakthrough for both Iberian countries came at the Fontainebleau summit in June 
1984, when national leaders announced that enlargement would take place in June 1984. In 
March 1985, foreign ministers resolved the remaining issues: fisheries, free movement of 
Spanish and Portuguese workers in the EC, and the applicant countries’ budgetary 
contributions.19 The final major agreement was the Integrated Mediterranean Programs, proposed 
by Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou in 1985. The program called for financial 
assistance mainly to Greece but also to Italy and southern France to help develop agriculture, 
tourism, and small business. Papandreou linked this program with enlargement.20 In March 1985, 
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the European Council agreed to the program in order “to adjust under the best conditions 
possible to the new situation created by enlargement.”21 On January 1, 1987, Portugal and Spain 
joined the EC.  
The first step of the accession process is establishing closer relations with potential 
member states through association agreements. They are a long standing tool for the EU’s 
external relations and in recent history, necessary for membership. Three examples of association 
agreements are the European Economic Area (EEA), Europe Agreements (EA), and the 
Stabilization and Association Process (SAP).  
On January 1, 1994, the EU and the member states of the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) created the European Economic Area as a long term framework for relations 
between them. EFTA was created in 1959 as an alternative to the EC for those that mistrusted 
supranationality or sought to keep their distance from the West for fear of antagonizing the 
USSR.22 The EFTA originally consisted of Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In 1961, Finland became an associate member, then a full 
member in 1986. Iceland joined EFTA in 1970. After joining the EEC, the UK and Denmark left 
the EFTA. Portugal followed suit in 1985 to become an EC member and Lichtenstein joined the 
EFTA in 1991.23  
Having already adopted much of the EU’s acquis in the mid 1980s, the EFTA countries 
called for a role in creating single market policies that directly affected them. When the 
Commission refused, a number of EFTA countries considered joining the EC. However, the EC 
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had just completed the Iberian enlargement (Spain and Portugal) and was uninterested in 
acquiring new members.24 As a compromise, the Commission proposed the EEA, a huge 
integrated market intended to encompass the twelve EC and seven EFTA members (Austria, 
Finland, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland). The EEA would be the 
largest and most lucrative commercial bloc, accounting for forty percent of global trade.25  
However, the EFTA countries considered the EEA to be only a transitional regime on the 
way to full membership. The EEA was further undermined by the European Court of Justice’s 
(ECJ) Opinion (1/1991) that the participation of EFTA judges was incompatible with EU law.26 
The opinion prevented a more symmetrical relationship between the EU and EFTA and thus 
reduced the appeal of the EAA as an alternative to enlargement.27 Following the accession of 
Austria, Finland, and Sweden to the EU in 1995 and the rejection by Swiss voters in December 
1992, the EAA no longer was viewed as a path towards enlargement.28 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the EU looked to devise an agreement for relations 
with the Central and European Countries (CEESCs). In December 1989, the Council agreed to 
create the appropriate form of association and the Commission’s Directorate-General for 
External Relations sketched a broad framework.29 In April 1990, The Council agreed to create 
Europe Agreements (EA) as a new type of association agreement. EAs were offered to the 
leading reformers, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.30 The EAs called for the creation of 
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free trade zones, the gradual adoption of EU legislation, and the launch of political dialogue. 
Most importantly, the agreement acknowledged that accession was the ultimate objective.31  
The EU policy towards Central and Eastern Europe was based on two principles: a single 
policy framework open to all countries in the region that sought to deepen their relations with the 
EU and the preservation of an element of differentiation which allowed the EU to place 
conditions on membership. The single policy framework spoke for the need for a visible and 
coherent EU policy towards post-communist Europe that would utilize the EU’s financial and 
administrative resources effectively and protect the EU from criticism that its commitment to the 
region was inconsistent.32 The second principle, differentiation, was created out of the belief that 
the EU should not deal with the region en bloc. Rather the EU should use conditionality based on 
the merits of individual performance.  
Although accession negotiations were opened up around the same time as the CEESCs, 
both Romania and Bulgaria underwent a much different accession process (accession 
negotiations opened up with Romania and Bulgaria on February 15, 2000).33 Both Romania and 
Bulgaria were given much tighter EU conditionalities during the negotiations of their 
Association Agreements in 1992. Their Europe Agreements included a “human rights clause” 
that made explicit reference to the protection of minority rights and a “unilateral suspension”  
that allowed either party to suspend cooperation in case the obligations of the agreement were 
not met.34 In addition, the Commission put forward a series of post-accession conditionalities 
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that allowed the Commission to monitor Romania and Bulgaria’s compliance with the acquis 
even after the two countries formally acceded to the EU. The “cooperation and verification 
benchmarks” set a series of benchmarks (six for Bulgaria and four for Romania) to be regularly 
monitored by the Commission with the threat that if they were not carried out, it would lead to 
the withdrawal of EU funding and the suspension of bilateral cooperation with other EU member 
states on judicial matters.35 These threats have been carried out, most recently in Bulgaria in 
2008, where €220 million was withdrawn as a result of a failure to tackle corruption.36 
Despite a seeming lack of progress, both countries were put on the fast track to accession 
due to a new EU security thinking for the wider Balkan region and as a reward for their crucial 
support to NATO during the Kosovo war.37 Bulgaria and Romania became EU members on 
January 1, 2007. 
Using the Europe Agreements as a template, the EU set out to create a regional 
framework for the Western Balkan countries. I will go into more detail about this approach later 
on in the chapter but in short, the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) was launched at a 
European summit in Zagreb, Croatia, in 2000. SAP aimed to support the economic and 
democratic transition of the Western Balkans and foster regional cooperation. It saw all SAP 
members as potential EU candidates.38  The two key elements of the SAP are a specific type of 
association agreement, stabilization and association agreements (SAAs), and financial assistance 
through the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development, and Stabilization 
(CARDS), now replaced, as discussed below by the Instruments for pre-Accession (IPA). 
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Association agreements provide the legal framework for would-be-members, until accession, 
even after they achieve the next two steps: potential candidate status and pre-accession 
alignment.39 
Once a country submits its application, the Commission conducts a “screening process” 
with the applicant country. It assesses whether the applicant is able to apply the acquis, and 
identifies possible challenges for the negotiations.40 After the screening process, the Commission 
drafts a common EU position that requires unanimous agreement by the Council. Then the 
Council decides unanimously to open, and afterward close provisionally, negotiations on specific 
chapters of the acquis. The acquis includes a number of elements, including:  
• Content, principles and political objectives of all EU Treaties;  
• Legislation and decisions adopted pursuant to the EU Treaties, and the case law of 
the ECJ; 
• Interinstitutional agreements, resolutions, statements, recommendations, and 
guidelines, legally binding or not, which were adopted by the EU; 
• Joint actions, common positions, declarations, conclusions and other acts within 
the framework of the common foreign and security policy; 
• Joint actions, positions, conventions signed, resolutions, statements and other acts 
agreed within the framework of justice and home affairs and; 
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• International agreements concluded by the Communities, the Communities jointly 
with their Member States, the EU, and those concluded by the Member States 
among themselves with regard to EU activities.41 
In the 2004 enlargement, there were thirty-one chapters, while in the case of Croatia, there are 
thirty-five chapters. The acquis itself is not negotiable and this precedent was established during 
the first enlargement round.42 The EU expects candidates to adjust unilaterally to existing EU 
laws, even if established policies and practices do not fit their specific situation. A timetable for 
adopting the acquis is the only thing candidate countries can negotiate.43 Among the candidate 
countries, Iceland and Turkey are the only ones with closed chapters. 
During the pre-accession process, the European Commission gives its opinion on whether 
the candidate is meeting the conditions of membership through progress reports and official 
opinions.44 The opinions are not binding and the Commission sends them to the European 
Council, which decides unanimously whether to accept them or not. Only in the case of Greece 
has the Council not followed the Commission’s recommendations.45 The two most recent 
opinions involved Croatia’s accession to the EU and Serbia’s application for membership.  
After the negotiations have concluded, and the European Parliament gives its consent, an 
accession treaty is signed by all governments and the candidate becomes an accession country. 
The Draft Accession Treaty lists all the transitional arrangements and deadlines, as well as the 
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details of financial arrangements and any safeguard clauses.46 Then the treaty has to be ratified 
by all member states and the acceding country.47  
Once the Accession Treaty is signed, the candidate becomes an acceding state, and is 
entitled to privileges until accession makes it a member state. It can comment on draft EU 
proposals, communications, recommendations, and initiatives, and has “active observer status” 
on EU bodies and agencies, where it can speak but not vote.48 Subsequently, once the ratification 
process is finished, and the treaty enters into force on the scheduled date, then the accession state 
becomes a member state. Ratification has not always been successful. Ratification referendums 
failed twice in Norway in 1972 and 1994. Also, France is the only member state to hold a 
referendum to ratify an accession treaty, in the case of the accession of the UK.49 
In addition to what is required in Article 49 in the Treaty of the European Union, the EU 
has put other conditions on the pre- accession process. The first direct statement of accession 
conditions came from the European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993. At the meeting, the 
Council declared for the first time that the CEECs that wanted membership could eventually 
become members. Many member states were reluctant about this and a debate ensued concerning 
the membership criteria. Some argued for quantitative criteria, such as a specific level of GDP 
per capita, in order to reduce the possibility of politically motivated decisions for or against 
enlargement.50 The Council accepted the Commission’s proposal for qualitative conditions that 
included not only the ability to apply the acquis after accession, but also political and economic 
criteria. The Copenhagen criteria require a candidate to have: 
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• Stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities; 
• A functioning market economy, as well as the ability to cope with the pressure of 
competition and the market forces at work inside the Union; 
• The ability to assume the obligations of membership, in particular adherence to 
the objectives of political, economic and monetary union.51 
In 1995, the European Council in Madrid added administrative capacity to the criteria. The 
Council stated, “…the strategy will have to be intensified in order  to create the conditions for  
the gradual,  harmonious  integration  of  those  States,  particularly through the development of 
the market economy, the adjustment of their administrative  structures and the creation of a 
stable economic and monetary environment.”52 
In order to prepare countries for membership, the EU provides financial assistance to both 
candidate and potential candidate countries. The countries that receive financial assistance are: 
Croatia, Iceland, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey, FYROM, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Kosovo. The total pre-accession funding for 2007-2013 is €11.5 billion.53 Since January 1, 2007, 
the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) has been the financial instrument for all pre-
accession funding. It replaces the Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring their 
Economies (PHARE) program, Instrument for Structural Policies for pre-Accession (ISPA), 
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Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD), the Turkey 
pre-accession instrument, and the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and 
Stabilization (CARDS), bringing them all into a single framework.54  
 The IPA consists of five components:  
I. Transition Assistance and Institution Building: Focuses on building and strengthening 
of the institutional framework related to the adoption and implementation of the 
acquis. Component I is open to all candidate and potential candidates and is managed 
by the Directorate-General (DG) Enlargement.  
II. Cross Border Cooperation: Supports cross-border cooperation between candidates 
and potential candidates and with the EU Member States. It can also fund 
participation in transnational cooperation programs and Sea Basin programs. 
Component II is open to all candidate and potential candidates and is managed by the 
DG Enlargement and DG Regional Policy  
III. Regional Development: Finances in areas of environmental protection, and transport, 
as well as the promotion of competiveness and regional development. It is open to 
candidate countries only and is managed by Directorate-General Regional Policy 
IV. Human Resources Development: Focuses on employment, education, and training, as 
well as social inclusion. It is open to candidate countries only and is managed by 
Directorate-General Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities.  
V. Rural Development: Contributes to sustainable rural development. It provides 
assistance for the restructuring of agriculture and its adaption to EU standards in the 
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areas of environmental protection, public health, animal and plant health, animal 
welfare, and occupational safety. It is open to candidate countries only and is 
managed by Directorate-General Agriculture and Rural Development.55 
The granting of IPA funding is based on the beneficiary country’s respect for the 
principles of democracy, the rule of law, and human, minority rights, and fundamental freedoms. 
It can be in the form of investments, procurements, contracts, subsidies, administrative 
cooperation, actions by the EU in the interest of the beneficiary country, measures to support the 
implementation process and program management, and budget support. 56 
Within the IPA is the Multi-Annual Indicative Financial Framework (MIFF), which is 
designed to provide information on the indicative breakdown of financial allocations by IPA 
beneficiaries. It acts as a link between the political framework within the enlargement package 
and budgetary process.57 The MIFF takes the form of a financial table covering a three year 
period, which is elaborated on the basis of the beneficiaries’ needs, absorption capacity, 
management capacity, and conditionality. Taking into account the framework proposed in the 
MIFF, the Multi-Annual Indicative Planning Documents (MIPD) are established for each 
country and list the assistance priorities. 
In addition, the multi-beneficiary programmes under Component I are designed to 
complement the national programs and to strengthen relations in the Western Balkans. Both 
regional and horizontal projects benefit from IPA assistance. Multi-beneficiary programmes 
support the Regional School for Public Administration, the Central European Free trade 
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Agreements (CEFTA), the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), fight against organized crime, 
and European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students (ERASMUS) 
scholarships and higher education.58 Institution building is also supported by the Technical 
Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument (TAIEX). Assistance from TAIEX comes in 
three forms, assessment missions, expert missions, and study visits. TAIEX coordinates expert 
workshops which provide specifics of EU legislation, regulation, procedures, and best practices. 
Assessment missions are a peer-based exercise whose purpose is to identify needs, provide a gap 
analysis or elaborate a strategy in a given sector.59 Expert missions involve experts from one or 
two Member States traveling to beneficiary countries and providing them with in-depth advice 
on specific parts of EU legislation, regulation, and best practices.60 Finally, study visits consist of 
three practitioners from the beneficiary country going on a study visit to EU member states 
lasting up to five days.61 TAIEX provides assistance to the Western Balkan Countries, Turkey, 
Iceland, Northern Cyrus, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine and 
Russia.62 
In the latest MIFF 2012-2013, there were seven sectors for 2011-2013 that the 
Commission focused its assistance on. They are justice and home affairs and fundamental rights; 
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public administration reform; environment and climate change; transports; private sector 
development; social development; and agriculture and rural developments.63 
The IPA is monitored by the Commission through its services in DG enlargement, DG 
Regional policy, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, DG Agriculture and 
Rural Development, and through the EU’s missions in the beneficiary countries.64 Once a year, 
the Commission puts out its report in the form of “the Annual Report on Financial Assistance for 
Enlargement.”65 
The first EU initiative aimed at stabilizing the Western Balkans was the Royaumont 
Process in December 1996. It came right after the Dayton Peace Accords and focused on 
promoting regional projects in civil society, culture and human rights.66 In April 1997, the EU 
General Affairs Council adopted the Regional Approach, establishing political and economic 
conditionality for the development of bilateral relations with the five Western Balkan countries 
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and 
FYROM). The conditions included the respect for democratic principles, human rights, and the 
rules of law; protection of minorities; market economy reforms; and regional cooperation.67 
However, the Regional Approach had limited success and focused more on the suspension of, 
and/or or exclusion form agreements, or the freezing of financial assistance.68 
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The Kosovo war showed the EU that their instruments of foreign policy, crisis 
management, and the Regional Approach were not working. The EU realized that a new 
approach was needed. The German Foreign Minister at the time, Joschka Fischer, summarized it 
best when he said, “if the awful conflict in Kosovo has brought something good with it, it is that 
we understand our belonging together far better.”69 Thus, the EU moved toward a two-pronged 
approach involving regional cooperation and closer ties with Europe. 
The EU launched the Stability Pact (SP) for the Western Balkans, simultaneously with 
the approval of Security Council resolution 1244. The SP received a broad mandate from the EU, 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Group of 8 (G8), NATO, and a 
large number of other states and institutions as a comprehensive form of preventive diplomacy.70 
The pact aimed to promote “peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic 
prosperity” in the region.71 The cornerstone of the SP was regional cooperation that called on the 
Balkan countries to first cooperate among themselves and then with international actors towards 
reaching a set of common objectives (creating a secure environment, promoting sustainable 
democratic systems, and promoting economic and social well-being). The SP was perceived as 
an intergovernmental body providing a forum for dialogue and cooperation. From a political 
perspective, the SP showed the international community’s commitment to the Western Balkans, 
while practically, it allowed for much needed coordination of various international structures.72 
The SP was soon overtaken by the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). 
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In the SAP, the Commission insisted on six new instruments: development of existing 
economic and trade relations with and within the region; development and partial redirection of 
existing economic and financial assistance; increased assistance for democratization, civil 
society, education, and institution-building; co-operation in the area of justice and home affairs; 
development of political dialogue, including at the regional level; and the development of 
Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA).73  
The SAA, the centerpiece of SAP, represents a contractual relationship between the EU 
and each Western Balkan country. The SAA focuses on respect for key democratic principles 
and the core elements which are at the heart of the EU single market. Just as the Europe 
Agreements did for the CEECs, the SAA provides the tools so the EU can bring the Western 
Balkans closer to the EU standards.74 Effective implementation of the SAA is a prerequisite for 
any further talks of accession. The EU signed the first SAA agreement with FYROM in April 
2001, followed by Croatia in October 2001.75 Albania signed their SAA on June 12 2006 and 
then Montenegro followed suit on October 15, 2007. On April 29, 2008, Serbia signed their SAA 
follow by Bosnia and Herzegovina on June 16, 2008. Kosovo is the only Western Balkan state 
that has not signed a SAA.  
The main financial instrument for SAP was the CARDS program. It had four main 
objectives:  
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• Reconstruction, democratic stabilization, reconciliation, and the return of 
refugees;  
• Institutional and legislative development, including harmonization with EU norms 
and approaches, in order to underpin democracy and the rule of law. 
• Sustainable economic and social developments, including structural reform and; 
• Promotion of closer relations and regional cooperation among SAP countries76 
The European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) managed CARDS for FYROM, Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Kosovo, while the EU was responsible for managing CARDS in Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Before it was replaced by the IPA, the EU allocated €4.65 billion in the 
period of 2002 to 2006.77 
 At the Zagreb Summit in November 2000, the EU Council reaffirmed the “European 
perspective of the countries participating in the stabilization and association process and their 
status as potential candidates for membership.”78 Three years after the Zagreb Summit, on June 
16, 2003, the Thessaloniki Summit confirmed the SAP as the policy framework for the EU 
provides the overall framework for helping the Western Balkan Countries to meet the 
Copenhagen Criteria and to eventually join the EU.79 
 In the next chapter, I will examine my three case studies, Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, focusing on the assistance they receive transitioning to democracy, including such 
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good governance areas as the fight against corruption and minority rights and refugees. The 
discussion is undertaken in the context of my hypothesis which is clearer and stronger 

















Chapter 4: Transition to Democracy-Problems, EU Conditions and Support  
 In this chapter, I will examine the countries of Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, focusing on the assistance they receive transitioning to democracy, including such 
good governance areas as the fight against corruption and the protection of minority rights and 
refugees. I will first explain the nature of each problem. Then I will cover the EU’s demands. 
Finally, I will describe the projects, i.e. where the money is going to assist the three countries. 
 As noted in the last chapter, the EU places certain conditions on candidate and potential 
candidate countries and then provides assistance under the Instrument for Pre-Accession 
Assistance (IPA). The focus in this study is on the IPA funding for the Component I-Transition 
and Institution Building, which covers all institution-building actions and investments related to 
the acquis.1 The IPA helps recipient countries build up administrative and judicial capacity and 
address cooperation measures not expressly covered by other components.2  
Croatia 
 Croatia has come a long way from when it declared independence from Yugoslavia on 
June 25, 1991. In the war for Croatia’s independence, Croatian nationalist forces battled the 
Serbian minority paramilitaries which were backed by the powerful federal army, the Yugoslav 
People’s Army (JNA). Fighting was ferocious on both sides, giving rise to the term “ethnic 
cleansing.”3 In 1991 alone, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) 
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estimated that 20,000 people were killed, 200,000 refugees fled from Croatia, and 350,000 
became internally displaced.4  
During the war in Croatia, the European Community (EC) was criticized for how they 
handled the situation. The EC was accused of being ambiguous and vague in their mediation 
goals. At times, they supported Yugoslav unity while other times the EU called for Croatia’s 
self-determination. On January 15, 1992, despite the recommendations of its own commission, 
the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, the EC formally recognized 
Croatia. 5 Croatia signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement on October 29, 2001 and 
applied for EU membership on February 21, 2003. The Commission lays down benchmarks for 
Croatia in thirty-five policy areas, all of which were satisfied by June 30, 2011. Table 4.1 shows 
the overall assistance given to Croatia from 2003 to 2013. 
Table 4.1 Croatia CARDS and IPA Assistance: 2003-2013 (million €) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Overall Assistance 62 81 105 140 141.2 146 151.2 153.5 156.5 151.1 95.4 




a. For 2003-2006: Financial allocation was administered under CARDS.  
b. For 2007-2013: Financial allocation was administered under the IPA  
 
Transition to Democracy  
 In 2003, Croatia held elections for the second time in its post-Communist history, which 
resulted in the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) returning to power. HDZ promoted a pro-
European Union platform and presented itself as a modern European conservative party. 
International and domestic observers deemed the 2003 elections as free and fair. However, the 
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Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) expressed serious concern about 
the country’s legislative framework for election, the absence of a permanent election 
administration, and the limited access to polling stations for refugee voters outside Croatia.6 In 
addition, Freedom House in their Nations in Transit 2004 Report noted that one of the most 
serious issues was the judiciary because of the slow pace of judicial reform and a backlog of 1.3 
million cases inherited from the 1990s.7  
In 2005, the EU reported that two elections were held in Croatia. One was presidential 
elections held over two rounds on January 2 and 16, 2005. The other was local elections held on 
May 15, 2005 for 426 municipal and 123 city councils, twenty county assemblies, and a new 
Zagreb City Assembly.8 According to the State Elections Committee and local NGO GONG, 
which observed both elections, voting in both the presidential and local elections were held in a 
tolerant atmosphere without any major irregularities. The irregularities observed mainly 
concerned out-of country voting and cases of double voting.9 The Commission also noted that 
there was a serious lack of clarity on the implementation of the provisions of the Constitutional 
Law on Minorities (CLNM) that dealt with allocation of reserved seats for minority 
representatives.10  
In 2007, the EU’s Progress Report noted that the Croatian parliament adopted a number 
of laws that addressed outstanding issues related to electoral legislation. However, they 
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expressed their concern that the data on permanent residence, which is the basis for voter 
registration, is incorrect.11  
To help assist Croatia in stabilizing their democracy, the EU provided €50.5 million from 
2002 to 2004 in CARDS assistance.12 Assistance focused on improving the legislative process, 
helping institutions in administering new election laws, and providing support to the media and 
civil society. The IPA does not provide projects that deal specifically with democratic 
stabilization. In addition, technical assistance to improve the legislative and administrative 
framework is provided by the OSCE.  
Governance Issues 
Corruption  
When Croatia applied for membership in 2003, it was ranked 59 out of 133 countries (the 
least corrupted country being placed first, and the most corrupted 133) by Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI).13 Such ranking meant that corruption was 
estimated to be very high. In December 2001, the Office for the Prevention of Corruption and 
Organized Crime (USKOK) was established to help prosecute corruption and organized crime. 
USKOK is attached to the State Attorney’s office.14 In 2002, the National Anti-Corruption 
Programme and Action Plan was drawn up. However, abuse of office was not covered in 
USKOK’s mandate until July 2007. Thus, it was difficult for the Croatian prosecution authority 
to employ USKOK in high level corruption cases. Also, some law enforcement agencies and 
                                                 
11Commission Staff Working Document Croatia 2007 Progress Report. Rep. no. SEC(2007) 1431. European 
Commission, 6 Nov. 2007. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/croatia_progress_reports_en.pdf> p. 7 
12 "CARDS Statistics 2000-2006." European Commission-Enlargement. 30 Oct. 2010. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-work/financial-assistance/cards/statistics2000-2006_en.htm> 
13 Corruption Perception Index 2005. Rep. Transparency International. Web. 15 Mar. 2012 
14 "About USKOK." Office for the Prevention of Corruption and Organized Crime. Croatian State Attorney's Office. 
Web. 03 May 2012. <http://www.dorh.hr/Default.aspx?sec=607> 
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state bodies involved in the fight against corruption were not providing reports to USKOK, 
which they are required to do by law.15  
With respect to the 2002 National Programme, it prioritized declarations of political will 
and the recognition that corruption constituted a serious problem for society. On March 31, 2006, 
the 2002 National Programme was replaced by the 2006-2008 National Programme for the 
Suppression of Corruption, which stressed the Croatian government’s determination to curb 
corruption by strengthening institutional capacity.16 Before 2006, the stress had been on the 
enactment of legislation; after 2006 it was on strengthening law enforcement.17 
The 2007 Progress Report commented that while some activities of the 2006-2008 
National Programme were being caried out, such as awareness raising, training, and increased 
transparency through the use of the internet, action plans of the different authorities responsible 
for implementing the Programme were not sufficiently detailed.18 A National Council for the 
Fight against Corruption, which was established to monitor the implementation of the National 
Programme was said to interpret its mandate too restrictively and to not see its role as making 
any proposals to improve the implementation of the National Programme but merely to monitor 
it.19 
To help improve the anti-corruption framework, the EU provided €17.033.500 since 
2003.20 Table 4.2 shows the assistance provided under CARDS from 2003 to 2006. Table 4.3 
shows the projects and funding under the IPA.  
                                                 
15 Commission Staff Working Document Croatia 2007 Progress Report. p. 51 
16 Anti-corruption Strategies and Action Plans in South-eastern Europe-current Status. Rep. no. PC-TC-(2006)16. 
PACO Impact, July 2006. Web. 3 May 2012. 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/corruption/projects/paco%20impact/PC-TC(2006)16-AC-
Strategies4July.PDF> p. 90 
17 Ibid. p. 90 
18 Commission Staff Working Document Croatia 2007 Progress Report. p. 51 
19 Ibid. p. 51 
20 Compiled from CARDS 2003-2006 and IPA 2007-2011 
52 
Table 4.2: CARDS Assistance to Fight Corruption-Croatia (million €) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Overall Assistance 7.0 0 2.0 2.5 




Table 4.3: IPA Projects to Fight Corruption-Croatia  
 
                                                 
21 Strengthening Capacities of USKOK. Rep. no. HR2007/01/23/1. European Commission. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/ipa/hr2007_01_23_1_version_07.09.2007_en.pdf>  p. 2-13 
22 Improving Anti-Corruption Inter-Agency Co-operation. Rep. no. HR2007/01/23/2. European Commission. Web. 
15 Mar. 2012. <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/ipa/hr2007_01_23_2_version_07092007_en.pdf>  p. 2  
23 Restoration and Equipping of the Premises for PNUSKOK Osijek and Rijeka. Rep. no. IPA/2011/022-954/3. 
European Commission. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/ipa/2011/03_pn_uskok_osijek_and_rijeka.pdf>  p. 2  
Projects Strengthening the 
Capacities of the Office 







Equipping of the 
Premises for PNUSKOK 






-Strengthen the rule of law 
by increasing the 
investigation and 
prosecution capacity of the 




-Improve the institutional 
capacity and efficient 
functioning of USKOK and 
continue the implementation 




-Strengthen the rule of law 
through the implementation 
of the National Anti 
Corruption Strategies and 
inter-agency cooperation at 
national and local levels 
 
Purpose 
1. Strengthen the Ministry 
of Justice Independent 
Department for Strategic 
Development (IDSD) as a 
coordination body in 
charge of drafting and 
implementing anti-
corruption strategies 
2. Strengthen the 
professional ethics in 
state and local 
administration and within 
judiciary bodies 
3. Improve inter-agency 
cooperation by 
developing a information 
system with  
Objective 
-Enhance the capacity of 
the Ministry of Interior to 




-Create preconditions for 
the effective operation of 
the National Police Office 
for Suppression of 
Corruption and Organized 
Crime (PNUSKOK) 
departments Osijek and 
Rijeka 
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Table 4.3 Continued:  
 
(Compiled from the IPA Assistance to Croatia <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/acceeding-
country/croatia/financial-assistance/index_en.htm>) 
Minority Rights and Refugees  
 In the area of minority rights and refugees several problems needed addressing. The Serb 
minority faced major discrimination in the public sector in access to employment. Second, Roma 
were excluded from mainstream life and face difficult living conditions. There was 
discrimination against Roma in access to employment, housing, and schooling.24 The Roma have 
no legal status or citizenship and coordination among Roma groups is weak and lacking 
expertise.  
In relation to refugees, former tenancy rights holders as well as others were encountering 
major housing problems when they attempted to return. The Croatian government implemented 
                                                 
24 Croatia 2005 and 2007 Progress Report  
Projects  Strengthening the 
Capacities of the Office for 
the Suppression of 












 4. a central database and 
secure Intranet/Internet 
access 
 Raise awareness on 
corruption through 
developing and 
implementing a public 
awareness campaign 
 
Budget €1.270.00 (€1.252.000 in 
EU contributions and 
€17.500 in national 
contributions) 
€2.550.000 (€2.488.000 in 
EU contributions and 
€62.000 in national 
contributions) 
€2.110.000 
(€1.793.500 in EU 
contributions and 




Contract Signed: 4Q 
2008/Project Completed: 4Q 
2010 
Contract Signed: 4Q 
2008/Project Completed: 
3Q 2010 
Contract signed: 1Q 
2013/Project 
Completed: 4Q 2013 
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housing care programs within and outside the areas of special state concern (ASSC) for the 
former tenancy rights holders who wished to return to Croatia but the process of providing 
housing was extremely slow.25 Apart from housing issues, refugees faced problems in accessing 
employment, enduring hostilities in validating certain documents and rights, including pension 
rights, of those living in the parts of Croatia not under the Croatian government’s control during 
the 1990s. 26 To address these problems, the EU provided €33.386.225 in funding.27 Table 4.4 
shows the overall amount under CARDS while Table 4.4 shows the projects and funding under 
the IPA.  
Table 4.4: CARDS Assistance to Protect Minority Rights and Refugees-Croatia (million €) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Overall Assistance 15 13 0 0 




Table 4.5: IPA Projects to Protect Minority Rights and Refugees in Croatia  
Projects Roma support 
Project-Phase III28 
Establishing a 
comprehensive system for 
anti-discrimination 
protection29 
Upgrading the capacitates for 
minors and other vulnerable 
groups of illegal migrants in the 






facilitate active and 
full participation of 
the Roma  
Objective 
Support the establishment 
of an efficient and effective 
system for combating  
Objective 
Strengthen institutional capacities 




                                                 
25 Commission Staff Working Document Croatia 2007 Progress Report p. 13 
26Ibid. p. 14 
27Compiled from CARDS 2003-2006 and IPA 2007-2011 
28Roma Support Project – Phase III. Rep. no. HR2008-01-35-05. European Commission. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/ipa/2008/2008-0101-05_roma_support_project_-
_phase_iii_version_081010_en.pdf>  p. 2-12 
29Establishing a Comprehensive System for Anti-discrimination Protection. Rep. no. HR2009-01-36-02. European 
Commission. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/ipa/2009/04_establishing_a_comprehensive_system_for_anti-
discrimination_protection.pdf> p. 2-14 
30Upgrading the Capacities for Minors and Other Vulnerable Groups of Illegal Migrants in the Reception Centre 
for Aliens. Rep. no. IPA/2011/ 022-954/6. European Commission, 2011. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/ipa/2011/06_reception_centre_for_foreigners.pdf> p. 2-13 
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Table 4.5 Continued  
Projects Roma support Project-
Phase III 
Establishing a 




capacitates for minors 
and other vulnerable 
groups of illegal 
migrants in the 





national minority in the 
economic, cultural, and 







conditions of the  
Roma settlements in 
Orehovica and Mursko 
Središće (Sitnice) in 
Međimurje  
County, by providing 
access to communal 
infrastructure and 
utilities, such as roads, 
water, and electricity 
supply 
discrimination in order  




1. Strengthen the  
capacity of the Office of 
the Ombudsman and the 
Office for Human 
Rights in combating 
discrimination.  
2. Develop an efficient 
system for statistical 
monitoring of the 
reported and prosecuted 
cases of discrimination  
Elaborate a comprehensive 
system of assistance to the 
victims of discriminatory 
practices 
fulfill the requirements  
of EU acquis in the field 
of illegal migration  
 
Goal 
Fulfill the criteria of the 
acquis concerning the 
detention of minors, 
illegal migrants, and other 
vulnerable groups of 
illegal migrants 
 
Budget €3.333.330 (€2.500.00 
in EU contributions and 
€833.330 in national 
contributions) 
€800.000 (€738.000 in EU 
contributions and €62.000 in 
national contributions) 
€2.527.323 (€2.148.225 
in EU contributions and 




Contract Signed: 4Q 
2009/Project 
Completed: 3Q 2010 
Contract Signed: 4Q 
2010/Project Completed: 1Q 
2013 








 Relations between the EU and Serbia have veered between positive and frictional. The 
move to include Serbia in the EU can first be traced to the late 1980s and the fall of communism 
in Europe. Yugoslavia was included in the Council Regulations on economic aid to certain 
Central and Eastern European countries, but was removed when war broke out in the 1990s. In 
56 
the late 1990s, a pledge for eventual membership was made to Serbia.31 In 1999, the Commission 
officially extended the opportunity for Serbia to join once it had fulfilled the Copenhagen 
Criteria. In 2000, the Zagreb Summit renewed the promise of including Serbia in the SAP and 
signaled the prospect of signing the SAA.32 The Feasibility Report, released on April 12, 2005, 
assessed Serbia as having progressed enough in meeting the SAP political and economic criteria 
and as ready to negotiate an SAA.33 SAA negotiations with Serbia opened up on October 10, 
2005. However the Commission found that the country did not meet its commitments with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and halted negotiations on 
May 3, 2006. Specifically, it noted the lack of progress in apprehending Ratko Mladić and that 
the “Action Plan” on co-operation with the ICTY suffered from deficiencies between civilian 
and military security services and in the role and power of prosecution.34 Negotiations resumed 
on June 13, 2007, after Serbia held parliamentary elections in January 2007, and a coalition made 
up of pro-democracy and pro-EU parties won and pledged to fully cooperate with the ICTY.35  
 An SAA was finally signed on April 29, 2008 in Luxembourg along with the Interim 
Agreement on trade and trade-related matters. EU ministers agreed to submit the SAA to their 
parliaments for ratification as soon as the Council should decide that Serbia was fully 
cooperating with the ICTY. Serbia submitted its application for EU membership on December 
22, 2010 and subsequently on October 25, 2010, the Council asked the Commission to submit its 
                                                 
31Johannes-Mikael Mäki. "EU Enlargement Politics: Explaining the Development of Political Conditionality of 'full 
Cooperation with the ICTY' towards Western Balkans." Politička Misao 45.5 (2008): 47-80. p. 64  
32Ibid. p. 65 
33Communication from the Commission on the Preparedness of Serbia and Montenegro to Negotiate a Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement with the European Union. Rep. no. COM(2005) 476 Final. EUR-Lex, 14 Apr. 2005. 
Web. 15 Mar. 2012. <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=505DC0476> 
34Commission Staff Working Document Serbia 2006 Progress Report. Rep. no. COM (2006) 649 Final. Commission 
of the European Communities, 8 Nov. 2006. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/sr_sec_1389_en.pdf> p. 15 
35"Serbian MPs Approve New Coalition." BBC News. BBC, 15 May 2007. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6660113.stm> 
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opinion on the application.36 On June 14, 2010, the Council decided to submit the SAA to their 
parliaments for ratification after it was decided that Serbia was fully cooperating with the 
ICTY.37  
 In their opinion on Serbia’s membership, the Commission found that Serbia had built up 
a positive track record in implementing its obligations under SAP and the Copenhagen Criteria. 
Also they noted that Serbia could take on the obligations of membership in nearly all of the 
acquis, provided that the alignment process continues and efforts are made to ensure the 
implementation and enforcement of legislation.38 Serbia became a European candidate country 
on March 1, 2012. Table 4.6 shows the overall assistance given to Serbia from 2003 to 2013.  
Table 4.6 Serbia CARDS and IPA Assistance: 2003-2013 (million €) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Overall 
Assistance 
324.3 307.9 282.5 257.5 189.7 190.9 194.8 197.9 201.8 202.0 214.7 
(Compiled from CARDS and IPA Financial Assistance to Serbia: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/serbia/financial-assistance/index_en.htm>) 
a. For 2003-2006: Financial allocation was administered under CARDS. Figures include the Republic of Serbia, 
the Republic of Montenegro, and  Kosovo under UNSCR 1244 
b. For 2007-2013: Financial allocation was administered under the IPA  
 
Transition to Democracy 
 Serbia’s democratic transition began much later than most post-Communist countries, 
with the fall of Slobodan Milosevic’s regime in October 2000. Democratization slowly resulted 
from elections won by the opposition and massive protests that forced the regime to accept the 
                                                 
36Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Commission Opinion on 
Serbia's Application for Membership of the European Union. Rep. no. SEC(2011) 1208 Final. European 
Commission, 12 Oct. 2011. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/sr_rapport_2011_en.pdf>  p. 2 
37 Council Conclusions on the Western Balkans 3023rd Foreign Affairs Council Meeting Luxembourg, 14 June 
2010. Rep. Council of the European Union, 14 June 2010. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/serbia/key_document/council_conclusions_on_wb_june__2010_en.pdf> p. 2 
38Conclusions and Recommendations of the Commission's Opinions on the Membership Applications by Serbia. 
Rep. European Commission. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/sr_conclusions_2011_en.pdf>  p. 1 
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results. The transition to democracy was also negotiated, in that some members of the old regime 
supported the opposition for the price of political protection.39 According to Freedom House, in 
2005 Serbia’s constitutional environment was problematic because the charter of the State Union 
of Serbia and Montenegro was frequently broken by both member states, and the 1990 Serbian 
Constitution stayed in place. The Serbian parliament faced serious challenges due to political 
instability and a lack of respect for legal procedures. The government of Serbia faced a serious 
problem in the high degree of politicization of public administration.40 In April 2005, the EU 
released a feasibility study on the preparedness of Serbia and Montenegro to negotiate an SAA 
with the EU. The study found that the judiciary was the main weakness in Serbia’s 
transformation to democracy. Despite some legal reforms, the appointment of judges and 
prosecutors remained susceptible to political pressure, and corruption was ever present.41 
 After the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro dissolved on June 5, 2006, and Serbia 
became its own independent state, a new constitution of the Republic of Serbia entered into force 
in November 2006. In 2007, the EU’s Progress Report noted that some provisions of the new 
constitution were not fully in line with European standards, specifically political party control of 
mandates of individual members of parliament, and the role of parliament in judicial 
appointments.42 In addition, the EU reported that parliamentary elections were held in January 
                                                 
39Nations in Transit 2006-Serbia. Rep. Freedom House. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2006/serbia> p. 1 
40 Ibid. p. 1  
41Commission Staff Working Paper Report on the Preparedness of Serbia and Montenegro to Negotiate a 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union. Rep. no. SEC (2005) 478 Final. European 
Commission, 12 Apr. 2005. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/sam_feasibility_report_staff_working_paper_en.pdf> p. 38 
42Commission Staff Working Document Serbia 2007 Progress Report. Rep. no. SEC(2007) 1435. European 
Commission, 6 Nov. 2007. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/serbia_progress_reports_en.pdf>  p. 6 
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2007. Though the elections were observed to be free and fair, they exposed the need for better 
regulation of party financing and a revision of voter registration.43  
 In 2010, the EU reported that the alignment of the constitution and constitutional law 
with European standards was progressing. However, a draft Statute of Vojvodina, endorsed by 
the Serbian parliament in 2009, has not yet been fully adopted.44 The Statute was adopted by the 
Provincial Assembly of Vojvodina in October 2008, in line with constitutional requirements. The 
Commission also noted that the electoral framework has only been partially revised and efforts 
are needed to improve the legislative output of the Serbian parliament.  
 To help assist Serbia in stabilizing its democracy, the EU adopted a Partnership 
Agreement on February 18, 2008. It called for the EU to ensure that the Serbian constitution is 
being implemented according to European standards, that Serbia is cooperating with the ICTY, 
and that Serbia is complying with its obligations under the SAA.45 The EU provided €185.7 
million from 2002 to 2006 under CARDS and technical assistance is being provided by other 
international organizations, such as the OSCE.46 
Governance Issues  
 Corruption 
Like Croatia, Serbia has encountered problems in the fight against corruption. In 2005, 
Transparency International ranked Serbia 97th out of 158 countries in the Corruption Perception 
                                                 
43Ibid. p. 7 
44 Commission Staff Working Document Serbia 2010 Progress Report. Rep. no. SEC(2010) 1330. European 
Commission, 9 Nov. 2010. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/sr_rapport_2010_en.pdf> p. 7 
45 European Council Decision of 18 February 2008 on the Principles, Priorities and Conditions Contained in the 
European Partnership with Serbia including Kosovo as Defined by United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1244 of 10 June 1999 and Repealing Decision 2006/56/EC. Rep. no. Official Journal L080,19/03/2008 P.0046-
0070. European Commission, 19 Mar. 2008. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:080:0046:01:EN:HTML> 
46 "CARDS Statistics 2000-2006." 
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Index.47 In December 8, 2005, the National Anti-corruption Strategy was adopted by the Serbian 
parliament and an action plan to implement the Strategy was adopted on December 2006. 48 By 
January 2010, the Anti-Corruption Agency started its work. The agency is responsible for 
preventive measures and the supervision of conflict of interest cases and funding of political 
parties. The EU noted in their 2010 Progress Report that implementation of the Action Plan 
continued to be slow and there was little progress in the investigation and prosecution of 
corruption cases.49 The Anti-Corruption Agency was not yet fully staffed and lacked a permanent 
premise and technical equipment. The existing legislation had significant problems and did not 
provide the Agency with sufficient investigative and sanctioning powers to monitor party 
funding effectively.50 
 There were also problems with the legal framework that regulates public procurement, 
the privatization process and larger budgetary expenditures, which the Commission noted, did 
not provide sufficient checks and balances to minimize the risk of corruption. A comprehensive 
audit system was not yet in place, which represented an obstacle to the establishment of a duly 
regulated public expenditure system capable of preventing systemic corruption.51  
In addressing these problems, the EU provided €28.5 million since 2003.52 Table 4.7 
shows the assistance provided under CARDS from 2003 to 2006. Table 4.8 shows the projects 
and funding under the IPA.  
 
 
                                                 
47 Corruption Perception Index 2005. Rep. Transparency International. Web. 15 Mar. 2012 
48 Commission Staff Working Document Serbia 2007 Progress Report. p. 11 
49 Commission Staff Working Document Serbia 2010 Progress Report. p. 11 
50 Ibid. p. 11 
51Commission Staff Working Document Serbia 2007 Progress Report p. 11 
52 Compiled from CARDS 2003-2006 and IPA 2007-2011  
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Table 4.7: CARDS Assistance to Fight Corruption-Serbia (million €) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Overall Assistance 0 19 2 2.5 




Table 4.8: IPA Projects to Fight Corruption-Serbia 
Projects Fight against 
corruption53 
Capacity building of the Directorate 
for Confiscated Property and 
improving the system of Criminal 
Asset Confiscation54 
Strengthening the 








strengthen institutions in 
Serbia which are 




-Contribute to reducing 
the level of corruption 
by supporting the 
operational functioning 
of a comprehensive 
agency that will 
coordinate the fight 
against corruption 
Objective 
-Contribute to democracy and the rule 
of law by suppressing organized crime 
and corruption in accordance with 
EU/international standards and 
Countering Money Laundering and 
Financing of Terrorism 
(MONEYVAL)/Group of States 
against Corruption (GRECO) 
 
Purpose 
-Enhance the institutional capacity and 
efficient functioning of the Directorate 
for Confiscated Property Management 
as well as other key institutions in the 
search, seizure, management and 
confiscation of the proceeds from 
crime in Serbia 
Objective 
-Contribute to good 
governance in Serbia 
by ensuring the rule of 
law, efficient state 
border  
security, improving the 
efficiency and 
accountability of the 
public sector, and 
tackling  
corruption as essential 
elements of a 
framework, within 






Justice Sector and anti 
corruption policy 
1. Subcomponent 1 
(Direct agreement 
with the World 
                                                 
53 Standard Summary Project Fiche-IPA Centralised Programmes Project Number 5: Fight against Corruption. 
Rep. no. 2008/020-406. European Commission. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/serbia/ipa/2008/5-anti-corruption_en.pdf>  p. 6 
54 Standard Summary Project Fiche–IPA Centralised National Programme Project Number 1: Capacity Building of 
the Directorate for Confiscated Property and Improving the System of Criminal Asset Confiscation. Rep. no. 
2009/021-638. European Commission. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/serbia/ipa/2009/1_criminal_assets_confiscation.pdf> p. 2-14 
55 Standard Summary Project Fiche – IPA Centralised Programmes Project Number 1: Strengthening the Rule of 
Law in Serbia. Rep. no. 2011/022-585. European Commission. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/serbia/ipa/2011/01_strengthening_the_rule_of_law_in_serbia.pdf> p. 17 
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Table 4.8 Continued  
Projects Fight against 
corruption 
Capacity building of 
the Directorate for 
Confiscated Property 
and improving the 
system of Criminal 
Asset Confiscation 





  Bank): Support to  
the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for 
Justice Sector 
 
a. Support the Multi Donor 
Trust Fund for Justice Sector  
in the introduction of sector 
wide approach in design, 
programming and 
implementation of justice 
sector reform initiatives 
2. Subcomponent 2 (Direct 
agreement with the Council of 
Europe): Strengthening the 
capacitates of law enforcement 
and judiciary in the fight against 
corruption in Serbia 
a. Improve the capacities and 
quality of the implementation 
of institutional reforms aimed 
at preventing and combating 
corruption 
Budget €2.500.000 in 
EU contributions 
€2.500.000 in EU 
contributions 
€2.000.000 in contributions from the 
World Bank and €1.400.000 in 








Contract Signed: 2Q 
2009/Project 
Completed: 2Q 2012 
Contract signed: 1Q 2012/Project 
Completed 4Q 2015 
 
(Compiled from the IPA Assistance to Serbia <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-
countries/serbia/financial-assistance/index_en.htm>) 
 
 Minority Rights and Refugees  
The Roma continue to face very difficult living conditions and discrimination in Serbia. 
Roma find it difficult to obtain personal documents, hindering their access to the social security 
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system, education, employment, and other services.56 A large portion of the Roma population 
lives in extreme poverty and exclusion, and regularly faces discrimination and attacks. Over 
eighty-percent of Roma children living in Roma establishments are poor and suffer from 
discrimination and exclusion. On average, only around one third of Roma children complete 
primary education.57 A national strategy for the improvement of the Status of Roma and a related 
action plan were adopted in 2009. In the 2011 Progress Report, the EU expressed the need for 
further funding of the strategy to improve its effectiveness.58 There is also no systematic 
approach to the relocation of illegal Roma settlements, which is often conducted inappropriately, 
resulting in serious violations of basic human rights. 
 As of January 2011, there are 73,608 refugees and 228,442 internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) in Serbia.59 Around 800 refugees and 2,500 IDPs were accommodated in twenty-nine 
collective centers.60 In 2002 a National Strategy for Resolving Issues of refugees and IDPs was 
adopted and revised in March 2011. The Commission noted in the 2011 Progress Report that 
around 97,000 IDPs remain in need of assistance for housing, employment and personal 
identification documents, with Roma being the most disadvantaged segment of the IDP 
population.61 To address these problems, the EU provided €114.65 million in assistance.62 Table 
4.9 shows the overall amount under CARDS while Table 4.10 shows the projects and funding 
under the IPA.  
 
                                                 
56Commission Staff Working Document Serbia 2007 Progress Report p. 16 
57Ibid. p. 16 
58Commission Staff Working Paper Analytical Report. Rep. no. SEC(2011) 1208. European Commission, 12 Oct. 
2011. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/sr_analytical_rapport_2011_en.pdf> p. 32 
59"2012 UNHCR Country Operations Profile-Serbia." UNHCR. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48d9f6> 
60Commission Staff Working Paper Analytical Report.  p. 32 
61Ibid. p. 32 
62Compiled from CARDS 2003-2006 and IPA 2007-2011 
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Table 4.9: CARDS Assistance to Protect Minority Rights and Refugees-Serbia (million €) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Overall Assistance 4 51.5 29.5 0 




Table 4.10: IPA Projects to Protect Minority Rights and Refugees-Serbia 
Projects Further support to 
refugees and Internally 
Displaced People (IDPs) in 
Serbia63 
Supporting access to 
rights, employment and 
livelihood enhancement of 
refugees and IDPs in 
Serbia64 
Support to the 
implementation of 
strategies for IDPs, 






-Build durable solutions to 




1. Integrate refugees 
through projects that 
will develop 
accommodation 
solutions , employment 
and income generation 
activities  





3. Contribute to the self-
reliance of  
Objective 
-Contribute to resolving the 
problems of refugees and 
IDPs in Serbia through the 




-Promote the livelihood 
improvement of the most 
vulnerable IDPs and refugee 
families through economic 
and housing support, 
information provision  
and access to social services 
Objective 
-Contribute to sound 
implementation of strategies 
for refugees, IDPs, and 








under the readmission  
agreements  
2. Facilitate the realization 
of the rights of 
refugees, IDPs, and 
returnees under the 
 
 
                                                 
63Standard Summary Project Fiche – IPA Centralised Programmes Further Support to Refugees and IDPs in 
Serbia. Rep. no. 2007/19322. European Commission. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/serbia/ipa/support_to_refugees_and_idps_en.pdf>  p. 1 
64Standard Summary Project Fiche – IPA Centralised National Programmes Project Number 2: Supporting Access 
to Rights, Employment and Livelihood Enhancement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Serbia. 
Rep. no. 2009/021-638. European Commission. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/serbia/ipa/2009/2_refugees_and_idps.pdf>  p. 9-10 
65Standard Summary Project Fiche – IPA Centralised Programmes Project Number 09: Support to the 
Implementation of Strategies for IDPs, Refugees and Returnees. Rep. no. 2011/022-585. European Commission. 
Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/serbia/ipa/2011/09_support_to_strategies_for_idps,_refugees_and_returnees.p
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Table 4.10 Continued 
Projects Further support to 
refugees and Internally 
Displaced People (IDPs) 
in Serbia 




refugees and IDPs in 
Serbia 
Support to the 
implementation of 
strategies for IDPs, 






socio economic support 
packages and legal 
assistance  
4. Secure the full 




legal assistance  
3. Since a significant 
number of returnees 
and IDPs are Roma, 
the project will benefit 
this vulnerable group 
Budget €10.000.000 in EU 
contributions 
€13.541.000 
(€12.650.000 in EU 
contributions and 
€891.000 in national 
contributions 
€7.722.000 (€7.000.000 in 
EU contributions and 




Contract Signed: 2Q 
2008/Project Completed: 
3Q 2010 
Contract Signed: 1Q 
2010/Project 
Completed: 4Q 2013 




(Compiled from the IPA Assistance to Serbia <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-
countries/serbia/financial-assistance/index_en.htm>) 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 Of our three cases, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is the farthest on its path to European 
accession. The EU established diplomatic relations once BiH declared independence from 
Yugoslavia in 1992. Their relationship intensified once the war ended and the EU began to shift 
its focus to the Western Balkans as a whole. The Roymaount Process began in December 1996. 
It was the first such initiative that focused on the stabilization of South-East Europe.66 In June 
1998, the EU-BiH Consultative Task Force was established and provided technical and expert 
advice in the fields of the judiciary, education, media, administration, and economy. In 1999, the 
EU initiated the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) for five South-Eastern Europe, 
                                                 
66Bedrudin Brljavac. "Assessing the European Criteria in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Litmus Test for the European 
Union." Journal of Comparative Politics 5.1 (2012): 4-23 p. 7 
66 
including BiH, and the SAP was confirmed by the Thessaloniki European Council as the EU 
policy for the Western Balkans.67  
 Bosnia and Herzegovina signed their SAA agreement along with an Interim Agreement 
on Trade and Trade-related issues (IA) on June 16, 2008 in Luxembourg. The IA entered into 
force in July 2008 but its implementation is mixed. According to the latest European 
Commission Progress Report (2011), BiH is in non compliance with the European Convention 
on Human Rights and with the rules on State Aid.68 The SAA has been ratified by all EU 
Member States but has not yet entered into force. Table 4.11 shows the overall assistance given 
to Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2003 to 2013. 
Table 4.11 Bosnia and Herzegovina CARDS and IPA Assistance: 2003-2013 (million €) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Overall Assistance 63 72 49.4 51 62.1 74.8 89.1 105.3 107.4 107.8 111.8 
(Compiled from CARDS and IPA Financial Assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/potential-candidates/bosnia_and_herzegovina/financial-
assistance/index_en.htm >) 
a. For 2003-2006: Financial allocation was administered under CARDS.  
b. For 2007-2013: Financial allocation was administered under the IPA  
 
Transition to Democracy 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political system is the product of the Dayton Peace Accords of 
November 1995 which ended the war in Bosnia. BiH operates under institutional supervision as a loose 
asymmetrical federation of autonomous entities: the centralized Serb-dominated Republika Srpska (RS), 
the decentralized Bosniak and Croat-dominated Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), and 
Brčko, a district with its own governing institutions.69 At the state level, BiH has a tripartite presidency 
with one Bosniak representative, one Serb, and one Croat. Seventeen years after the Dayton Peace 
                                                 
67 Ibid. p. 7  
68Commission Staff Working Paper Bosnia and Herzegovina 2011 Progress Report. Rep. no. SEC(2011) 1206 Final. 
European Commission, 12 Oct. 2011. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/ba_rapport_2011_en.pdf>  p. 7  
69 Core Document Forming Parts of the Reports of States Parties Bosnia and Herzegovina. Rep. no. 
HRI/CORE/BIH/2011. United Nations International Human Rights Instruments, 2011. p. 16 
67 
Accords, BiH remains dependent on international involvement, especially the Office of the High 
Representative (OHR), which is responsible for the civilian implementation of the Dayton Peace 
Accords.70 
 2006 was marked by two major events. First, in April 2006, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
Parliamentary Assembly rejected a package of proposed constitutional amendments. The amendments 
would have improved the functionality of the state and enhanced its capacity to negotiate with the EU, 
and redistribute some competences.71 Second, presidential and parliamentary elections occurred on 
October 2006. They were the first elections since the Dayton Peace Accords to be fully administered by 
the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The elections were generally considered to be run in 
accordance with international standards for democratic elections.72 However, Freedom House reported 
that because of constitutional limitations and ethnicity-based nominations, the elections violated the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the obligations toward membership in the Council 
of Europe.73 
 In 2010, the EU’s Progress Report noted that in autumn 2009, a joint EU-U.S. initiative 
to help meet the minimum requirements of the EU accession process, improve the functionality 
of the state, and align the Constitution with the ECHR was started. However, no agreement on a 
way forward emerged.74 
Recently, Bosnia and Herzegovina underwent major political turmoil. Until December 
28, 2011, BiH was without a state-level government following their general elections in October 
                                                 
70 Ibid. p. 16 
71 Commission Staff Working Document Bosnia and Herzegovina 2007 Progress Report. Rep. no. SEC(2007) 1430. 
European Commission, 6 Nov. 2007. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/bosnia_herzegovina_progress_reports_en.pdf> p. 10 
72 Ibid. p. 10 
73  Nations in Transit 2007-Bosnia and Herzegovina. Rep. Freedom House. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2007/bosnia-and-herzegovina> p. 5 
74 Commission Staff Working Document Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010 Progress Report. Rep. no. SEC(2010) 1331. 
European Commission, 9 Nov. 2010. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/ba_rapport_2011_en.pdf> p. 8 
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2010.75 Thus, during that time, no state-level legislation was adopted, including a state budget. In 
the run-up and after the general election in October, 2011 nationalistic rhetoric continued. Legal 
and political actions by the Republika Srpska challenged the authority of the High 
Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and BiHs state-level institutions, competencies, and 
laws. On April 13, 2011, the Republika Srpska National Assembly adopted a series of 
conclusions and a decision to hold a referendum on the powers of the High Representative for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the powers of BiHs state-level judicial institutions.76 The 
conclusion rejected the authority of the High Representative to impose legislation.77 Following a 
visit on May 13, 2011 to BiH by the European Union High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission, Ms. Catherine 
Ashton, the Republika Srpska authorities voted on June 1, 2011 to annul the decisions on holding 
a referendum and review the previously adopted conclusions. However, in his fortieth report, 
High Representative for BiH, Valentin Inzko, noted that the conclusions adopted remain in force 
and appear to shape the polices of RS. 78  
 In addition, several high-level officials of Republika Srpska called for the separation of 
RS from BiH, threatening the stability of the country. For example, the RS President asserted 
that the Bosniak people can only build their identity by destroying others and other officials have 
                                                 
75 "Breakthrough on Bosnian Impasse." Balkan Insight. 28 Dec. 2012. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/end-of-political-stalemate-in-bosnia> 
76The proposed referendum question had been the following: “Do you support the laws imposed by the High 
Representative of the International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly those pertaining to the Court 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and their unconstitutional 
verification in the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina.?”  
77Report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Activities of the 
European Union Military Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. p. 3 
78Fortieth Report of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Rep. no. S/2011/682. United Nations, 4 
Nov. 2011. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/575/00/PDF/N1157500.pdf?OpenElement> p. 11 
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called for a referendum for succession.79 In response, some Bosniak political leaders warned of 
possible conflict if there was an attempt to divide the country. Some Federation politicians called 
for the creation of a Croat dominated entity within BiH.80 
 In July 2011, just before the fiftieth anniversary of the genocide in Srebrenica in 1995, 
several high-level politicians from RS made statements praising the perpetrators of this crime, 
including Radovan Karadžić, who is currently awaiting trial at the ICTY.81 Some politicians also 
denied that the genocide actually took place.  
 Like Serbia, to help assist Bosnia and Herzegovina in stabilizing their democracy, the EU 
adopted a Partnership Agreement on February 18, 2008. It called inter alia, for the EU to provide 
BiHs parliament with technical resources and personnel, help establish mechanisms for political, 
legislative, and technical cooperation between State and the Entities, and help amend the 
electoral legislation to ensure full compliance with ECHR and the Council of Europe post-
accession commitments.82 The EU provided €55 million from 2002 to 2006 under CARDS and 
technical assistance is being provided by other international organization, such as the OSCE.83 
Governance Issues 
 Corruption 
In 2005, Transparency International ranked Bosnia and Herzegovina 88th out of 158 
countries in the Corruption Perception Index.84 In May 2006, Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a 
National Anti-Corruption Strategy and action plan but it was insufficiently implemented and had 
                                                 
79Ibid. p. 10-11 
80Ibid. p. 12  
81 "Bosnia and Herzegovina Annual Report 2011." Amnesty International. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/bosnia-herzegovina/report-2011> 
82 Council Decision of 18 February 2008 on the Principles, Priorities and Conditions Contained in the European 
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83"CARDS Statistics 2000-2006." 
84 Corruption Perception Index 2005. Rep. Transparency International. Web. 15 Mar. 2012 
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coordination problems between the Entities. Therefore a new Strategy against Corruption 2009-2014 and 
the related Action Plan were adopted.85 However, its implementation had been limited due to a lack of 
political will and institutional capacity, the 2011 Progress Report noted.86 On January 2007, a third 
evaluation report adopted by the GRECO underlined the need to enforce the legal framework and 
improve the coordination and training of the agencies involved in fighting corruption. The Commission 
noted that BiH has only done little to follow through on the recommendations of the report to improve 
anti-corruption legislation.87 In addition effective investigation, prosecution, and conviction of corruption 
cases remained low. When corruption cases did occur, they were often minor cases, while high level 
corruption cases have ended in the dropping of the charges, acquittals, or suspended sentences.88 To 
address these problems the EU provided €39 million in funding.89 Table 4.12 shows the overall 
amount under CARDS while 4.13 shows the projects and funding under the IPA.  
Table 4.12: CARDS Assistance to Fight Corruption-Bosnia and Herzegovina (million €) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Overall Assistance 10 23.5 0 0 














                                                 
85 Commission Staff Working Document Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009 Progress Report. Rep. no. SEC(2009) 1338. 
European Commission, 14 Oct. 2009. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/ba_rapport_2009_en.pdf> p. 14 
86 Commission Staff Working Paper Bosnia and Herzegovina 2011 Progress Report. Rep. no. SEC(2011) 1206 
Final. European Commission, 12 Oct. 2011. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
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87 Staff Working Document Bosnia and Herzegovina 2007 Progress Report p. 14 
88 Commission Staff Working Paper Bosnia and Herzegovina 2011 Progress Report p. 13 
89 Compiled from CARDS 2003-3006 and IPA 2007-2011 
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Table 4.13: IPA Projects to Fight Corruption-Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Projects Support to the State Court and 
Prosecutor’s Office of BiH to 
fight war crimes and organized 
crime90 
Strengthening the 
capacities of BiH 
institutions to combat 
and prevent 
corruption91 
Implementation of the 
Anti-Corruption 







1. Build sustainable institutional 
capacity at the State level by 
strengthening the Court of 
BiH and the Prosecutor’s 
Office of BiH  
2. The Strategic framework is to 
improve the overall 
effectiveness an impartiality 
of these institutions through 
their ability to consolidate the 
rule of law and address 
violations of international 
humanitarian law committed 
during Bosnia war between 
1992 and 1995 in addition to 
the prosecution of organized 
crime, economic crime and 
corruption cases 
Purpose 
-Build sustainable professional 
and technical capacities for 
prosecuting and investigating 
cases related to war crimes, 




capacities of BiH 
institutions to enforce 
accountability and 




1. Strengthen the 
institutional and 
administrative 
capacities of the 
anti-corruption body 
in order to enable it 
to fulfill its mandate 





mandate is to 




3. Reinforce corruption  
Objective 
-Contribute to the fight 
against corruption and 
effective corruption 
prevention in BiH  
 
Purpose 
-Support the institutions in 
BiH to effectively 
implement effectively the 
Anti-Corruption Strategy 
and its Action Plan in 
cooperation with civil 






                                                 
90IPA National Programme 2008 Part I-Bosnia and Herzegovina: Project Fiche 2: Support to the State Court and 
Prosecutor’s Office of BiH to Fight War Crimes and Organised Crime. Rep. no. 2008/20-111. European 
Commission. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
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1/pf_05_ipa_2010_anti_corruption_2010.04.29_en.pdf> p. 11-12 
72 
Table 4.13 Continued 
Projects Support to the State 
Court and 
Prosecutor’s Office of 
BiH to fight war 
crimes and organized 
crime 
Strengthening the 
capacities of BiH 
institutions to combat 
and prevent 
corruption 
Implementation of the 
Anti-Corruption 
Strategy and Action 
Plan 
Overall Objective and 
Purpose 
 prevention capacities of 
public institutions and 
law enforcement 
agencies through more 
extensive training and 




Budget €3.000.000 in EU 
contributions 
€500.000 in EU 
contributions 




Contract Signed: 2Q 
2009/Project 
Completed: 2Q 2010 
Contract Signed: 2Q 
2010/Project 
Completed: 4Q 2011 
Contract Signed: 3Q 
2011/Project 
Completed: 3Q 2013 
 




 Minority Rights and Refugees 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are seventeen officially recognized minorities. The 
three constituent peoples, Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs do not constitute minorities.93 Because 
minorities do not belong to the three constituent peoples, they have been excluded from 
representation in the State-level House of Peoples and the Presidency.94 The National Minority 
Council was established in February 2008 to act as an advisor to the Parliamentary Assemble. 
However, the 2011 EU Progress Report noted their influence has remained limited due to the 
lack of political and financial support.95 
                                                 
93 "Bosnia and Herzegovina Overview." Minority Rights Group International. Oct. 2011. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=2471> 
94 Commission Staff Working Paper Bosnia and Herzegovina 2011 Progress Report p. 19 
95 Ibid. p. 19 
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 The most vulnerable minority group in BiH is the Roma.96 Discrimination against Roma 
persists in access to housing, social services, education, and employment. In September 2008, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina joined the Decade for Roma inclusion 2005-2015. At the same time, 
BiH adopted an Action Plan on Roma housing, health, and employment. The Action plan 
complements the 2004 Action Plan on the Education Needs of Roma and Members of Other 
National Minorities.97 By 2011, the EU reported that there has been little progress on 
implementing the action plan on health while the action plan on the education needs of Roma 
needed to be stepped up.98 
 As of January 2011, 113,365 IDPs, including 7,492 in collective centers, and 7,000 
refugees were living in BiH.99 Refugees continue to face discrimination in access to 
employment, health care, pension rights, and social protection. To address these problems, the 
EU provided €54.3 million in funding.100 Table 4.14 shows the overall amount under CARDS 
while Table 4.15 shows the projects under the IPA.  
Table 4.14: CARDS Assistance to Protect Minority Rights and Refugees-Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (million €) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Overall Assistance 19.5 7.5 3.1 2.5 





                                                 
96 Ibid. p. 19 
97Commission Staff Working Document Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008 Progress Report. Rep. no. SEC(2008) 2693 
Final. European Commission, 5 Nov. 2008. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-
documents/reports_nov_2008/bosnia_herzegovina_progress_report_en.pdf> p. 20-21 
98 Commission Staff Working Paper Bosnia and Herzegovina 2011 Progress Report p. 19 
99"2012 UNHCR Country Operations Profile-Bosnia and Herzegovina." UNHCR. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48d766> 
100Compiled from CARDS 2003-2006 and IPA 2007-2011 
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Table 4.15: IPA Projects to Protect Minority Rights and Refugees-Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Projects Enhancing the Social 
Protection and Inclusion 
System for Children in  
Bosnia and Herzegovina101 
Support for Vulnerable 
Groups in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina102 
Enhancing the social 
protection and 
inclusion system for 






-Development of a fiscally 
sustainable and effective 
social safety net and the 
establishment of a 
harmonized, well targeted, 
efficient, and sustainable 
social protection system 
 
Purpose 
-Support minority and 
vulnerable groups concerns in 
particular services, legislative 
matters, and socio-economic 
development that is in line 
with BiH’s own sectoral 
reform and development 
strategies taking into account 
the Mid-term Development 
Strategy and EU Integration 
Strategy for BiH  
Objective  
-Combat social exclusion in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Purpose 
-Develop an integrated Social 
Protection and Inclusion 
Strategy that will support 
minority and excluded groups 
by strengthening public 
services, legislative 
frameworks, and influence 
socio-economic 
developments in coordination 
with BiH’s own reform and 
development strategies  
Objective  
-Contribute to the 
development of a 
fiscally sustainable and 
effective social safety 
net and to the 
establishment of a 
harmonized, well-
targeted, efficient, and 
sustainable social 




government partners in 
establishing a country-
led process for the 
development and 
implementation of a 
sustainable strategy for 
integrated social 
protection and inclusion 
of children  
and families in BiH 
Budget €1.300.000 in EU 
contributions  
€1.955.555 (€1.900.000 
in EU contributions and 
€55.555 in private 
contributions) 
€1.650.000 (€1.400.000 
in EU contributions and 




Contract Signed: 1Q 
2008/Project Completed: 1Q 
2009 
Contract Signed: 3Q 
2009/Project Completed: 3Q 
2011 
Contract Signed: 4Q 
2010/Project Completed: 
4Q 2011 
(Compiled from the IPA Assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina < http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/potential-
candidates/bosnia_and_herzegovina/financial-assistance/index_en.htm>) 
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 In the next chapter, I will assess whether progress has been made in their transition to 
democracy including in the areas of corruption and the protection of minority rights and 
refugees. The aim is to evaluate whether EU assistance correlates to improvements in the 
democratic areas.  
76 
Chapter 5: Critique of EU Approach in the Western Balkans 
 I am now going to look at whether the EU’s projects in the Western Balkans have had 
any positive effects on the areas they were designed to impact. 
Fight against Corruption 
Croatia has increased the transparency and integrity of its public administration and state 
owned companies. The government has also stepped up the fight against corruption and 
improved interagency cooperation. However, the Commission noted that many high level 
corruption cases have not yet been concluded and Croatia needs to start a track record of 
successfully handling organized crime and corruption cases. Also, Croatia needs more 
experience in implementing newly adopted legislation and the implementing structures have to 
be further strengthened.1 
 Regarding Serbia, the Commission paints a somewhat bleaker picture. The 
Commissioners noted that Serbia has put in place a legal and institutional framework, including 
an Anti-Corruption Agency and a new law on funding political parties to fight corruption. Also 
steps have been taken for the specialization of certain law enforcement agencies to fight 
corruption and a large number of cases have been prosecuted.2 However, the Commission did 
remark that corruption remains prevalent in many areas and continues to be a serious problem. 
There needs to be stronger political will and law enforcement agencies need to take a more pro-
active approach in investigating and prosecuting corruption. Finally the Commission believes 
                                                 
1Commission Staff Working Paper Croatia 2011 Progress Report. Rep. no. SEC(2011) 1200 Final. European 
Commission, 12 Oct. 2011. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/hr_rapport_2011_en.pdf>  p. 8  
2Commission Staff Working Paper Analytical Report. Rep. no. SEC(2011) 1208. European Commission, 12 Oct. 
2011. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/sr_analytical_rapport_2011_en.pdf> p.  22  
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that the Serbian judiciary needs to build up a better track record of final convictions, including 
high level cases.3 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH), according to the Commission, is “still at the early stage 
in the fight against corruption.”4 Corruption is still very prevalent in many areas and remains a 
serious threat throughout the private and public sectors. Though a legal framework is in place, 
corruption continues to negatively impact all spheres of life, economic development, and the rule 
of law.5 The third GRECO evaluation, launched in January 2007 and published in May 2011, 
highlighted a number of deficiencies in the legal framework to fight corruption. Specifically, 
there is a lack of harmonization if the four existing Criminal Codes in the country. The lack of 
consistency was noticeable with the criminalization of bribery and jurisdiction.6 
 Looking at independent sources, the actual picture of corruption in Croatia, Serbia, and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is bleaker then what the Commission reports. According to a Gallup 
House Poll conducted in cooperation with the European Fund for the Balkans in 2010, 89% of 
Croatians believed that corruption is widespread in government and 93% believe that corruption 
is widespread in business in 2010.7 In both cases, this was an increase since 2006. In 2006, 77% 
of Croatians believe that corruption was widespread in government. In 2009, the percentage of 
respondents increased to 87% and then to 89% in 2010.8 For business perception in 2006, the 
                                                 
3Ibid. p. 22 
4Commission Staff Working Paper Bosnia and Herzegovina 2011 Progress Report p. 14 
5Ibid. p. 14  
6Third Evaluation Round Evaluation Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina Incriminations (ETS 173 and 191,GPC 2). 
Rep. no. Greco Eval III Rep (2010) 5E+ANNEX. Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO), 27 May 2011. 
Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/GrecoEval3(2010)5_BiH_One_EN.pdf>  p. 34  
7Gallup Balkan Monitor Insights and Perceptions: Voices of the Balkans 2010 Summary of Findings. Rep. Gallup, 
Inc. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. http://www.balkan-monitor.eu/files/BalkanMonitor-2010_Summary_of_Findings.pdf p. 12 
8Ibid. p. 35 
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percentage of Croatian respondents was 83%. The percentage increased to 92% in 2009 and then 
increased again to 93% in 2010.9  
 In Serbia, unlike in Croatia, the percentage of respondents saying corruption was 
widespread in government and business decreased from 2009 to 2010. In 2006, 71% of 
respondents believed that corruption was widespread in government and 82% believed it was 
widespread in business.10 In 2009 for government, the percentage increased to 84%, then 
decreased to 81% in 2010. For businesses in 2006, 82% of respondents believed corruption to be 
widespread. Following the corruption in government trend, the percentage of respondents 
increased in 2009 to 91% and then decreased to 88% in 2010.11 
Within Bosnia and Herzegovina there was a striking difference in the perception of 
government corruption between the two Bosnian entities: while in the Federation 93% of 
respondents were convinced that corruption was common at the governmental level, the 
corresponding figure for the Republika Srpska was 71% in 2010.12 BiH follows the same trend as 
Serbia in terms of the perception of corruption in business. In 2006, the percentage of 
respondents was 86%. This increased to 90% in 2009 and then decreased to 87% in 2010.13  
Chart 5.1 shows the Gallup results in terms of the percentage of respondents who believe 
corruption is widespread throughout government while Chart 5.2 shows the percentage of 
respondents who believe corruption is widespread within business. Overall, then, in every 
country about 85% of respondents agree that corruption is rampant in 2006-2010. This is an 
extremely high percentage.  
                                                 
9Ibid. p. 35 
10Ibid. p. 35 
11Ibid. p. 35 
12Ibid. p. 35 
13Ibid. p. 35 
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(Source: 2010 Gallup Balkan Monitor Insights and Perceptions Voices of the Balkans 
http://www.balkan-monitor.eu/files/BalkanMonitor-2010_Summary_of_Findings.pdf) 
 
The perception of higher corruption is corroborated by a 2011 United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report on corruption in the Western Balkans and its impact on 
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increased, remained stable, or decreased since 2007. 30% of Croatians perceive that corruption 
has increased, 55% perceive that corruption has remained the same, and 12% believe it has 
decreased.14 In Serbia, the percentages were 32%, 52%, and 12%.15 BiH had the highest 
percentage of respondents who believe that corruption has increased, 45%. 47% believe that 
corruption has remained the same and only 5% believe it has decreased.16 
 Transparency International published a Global Corruption Barometer report in 2010. The 
report is a survey that assesses the general public attitudes and experiences of corruption. The 
barometer asked the question, “To what extent do you perceive the following institutions in this 
country to be affected by corruption (1-not at all corrupt, 5 extremely corrupt)”.17 The 
institutions were the judiciary, media, business, parliament/legislature, and political parties.  
 Looking at these three charts below, we see that for all three countries, respondents 
believed that the judiciary is the most corrupt, followed by political parties, and the parliament. 
From year to year, the perception of corruption among the five institutions has remained 
relatively the same. Compared to 2007, the results for 2010 remained relatively the same. For 
Croatia in 2010, the judiciary scored the highest in corruption decreasing by 0.2 in 2007(4.3 in 
2007 to 4.1 in 2010). Businesses received the next highest score, though the score decreased by 
0.1 from 2007 (4 in 2007 to 3.9 in 2010). 18 For Serbia, the perception of corruption in political 
parties increased by 0.2 (4 in 2007 to 4.2 in 2010) and the judiciary increased by 0.1 (3.8 in 2007 
to 3.9 in 2010) between 2007 and 2010.19 For BiH, the perception of corruption in all institutions 
                                                 
14Corruption in the Western Balkans. Rep. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011p.  44 
15Ibid. p. 44 
16Ibid. p. 44 
17"Global Corruption Barometer 2010." Transparency International. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2010/results> 
18Transparency International 2009 Global Corruption Barometer. Rep. Berlin, Germany: Transparency 
International, 2009 p. 31 
19Ibid. p. 31 
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decreased between 2007 and 2010. The judiciary decreased by 0.7 (4.2 in 2007 to 3.5 in 2010 
while political parties decreased by 0.3 (4.4 in 2007 to 4.1 in 2010).20 
 
(Compiled from Transparency International: 2007 to 2010 Global Corruption Barometer 
<http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb>) 
a. Question asked “To what extent do you perceive the following institutions in this country to be affected by 
corruption”(1-not at all corrupt, 5 extremely corrupt) 
 
 
(Compiled from Transparency International: 2007 to 2010 Global Corruption Barometer 
<http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb>) 
a. Question asked “To what extent do you perceive the following institutions in this country to be affected by 
corruption”(1-not at all corrupt, 5 extremely corrupt) 
                                                 



















Chart 5.3: Croatia-Global Corruption Barometer 
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(Compiled from Transparency International: 2007 to 2010 Global Corruption Barometer 
<http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb>) 
a. Question asked “To what extent do you perceive the following institutions in this country to be affected by 
corruption”(1-not at all corrupt, 5 extremely corrupt) 
 
Further substantiating our claim that the EU’s policies have done little to stifle 
corruption, we will look at Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The 
CPI ranks countries according to their perceived levels of public-sector corruption. For the 2011 
report, data was calculated from seventeen sources from thirteen institutions, including the 
World Bank, Freedom House, and the Economist Intelligence Unit.21 The questions include 
bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds, and 
the effectiveness of public-sector anti-corruption efforts. Countries are scored from 0-10, with a 
zero meaning highly corrupt and a ten meaning very clean.22 Included with the CPI score and 
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rank are the number of sources and the confidence range for each country. The CPI 2011 
evaluates 183 countries. Below are the results for the three case studies in the 2011 CPI:23 
Table: 5.1: Corruption Perception Index 2011 
Country Score 
(1-10) 
Rank (of 183 
countries) 
Sources Confidence Range 
Croatia 4 66 10 3.7-4.4 
Serbia 3.3 86 7 3-3.6 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
3.2 91 6 3-3.4 
(Source: Transparency International-2011 Corruption Perception Index 
<http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/>) 
 
 Looking at the previous CPI’s since 2007, we see that the rankings have remained steady, 
although they have to be interpreted with caution because the number of countries changed.24 
Chart 5.3 is a summary of scores since 2007 (rankings not included).  
 
(Compiled from Transparency International-2007 to 2011 Corruption Perception Index 
<http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/>) 
 
                                                 
23Corruption Perceptions Index 2011. Rep. Transparency International, 2011. Web. 15 Mar. 2012 p. 4 





















Chart 5.6:2007-2011 Corruption Perception Index
Croatia Serbia Bosnia and Herzegovina
84 
Protection of Minority Rights and Refugees  
 In dealing with minority rights and refugees, the Commission noted in its 2011 Progress 
Report that Croatia has made progress and that cooperation between political representatives of 
minorities and the government remains good.25 Though financial funding for minority 
organizations decreased by 1.25 percent, conditions for the effective implementation of the 
constitutional act on the rights of national minorities have improved. The number of racist or 
xenophobic incidents has decreased and in terms of those incidents that do occur, the police and 
political response level has increased.26 While the numbers of attacks on the Serb minority have 
decreased, they face difficulty in employment. In regards to dealing with the Roma, the 
Commission noted improvements in access to education and provision of adequate housing. 
However, Roma still face much discrimination in the areas of education, social protection, 
health, employment, and housing.27 The Roma continue to face a problem regarding their 
residence and citizenship. Finally, the report remarked that Croatia has made good progress on 
refugee return. The Commission estimates that 132,872 refugees (mostly Serbian) have returned 
to Croatia, which is approximately half of those who fled the country up until 1995.28 Croatia has 
its Action Plan on the Housing Care Programme for returning refugees and has met its 2009 
target for building 2,070 homes.  
 Regarding Serbia, the Commission noted that the legal and policy framework for human 
rights and the protection of minorities is in line with European standards. Implementing the 
legislation needed to protect human rights does need to be stepped up though. In addition, while 
                                                 
25Commission Staff Working Paper Croatia 2011 Progress Report p. 12  
26Ibid. p. 12 
27Ibid. p. 12  
28Ibid. p. 13  
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the Commission noted that human rights are generally respected in Serbia, the situation 
regarding refugees and internally displaced people remains a very high concern.29  
 Finally, the Commission reported that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Roma continue to face 
discrimination and harsh living conditions. Also, action plans on health and education need to be 
implemented better and access to pension rights, health care, and social protection for refugees 
needs to be improved.30 Refugees continue to face difficulties with economic reintegration, 
access to health care, social protection, pensions, and employment.  
 Results from independent sources show a slightly less optimistic picture. In their January 
2012 report, Human Rights Watch noted that Croatia’s progress on human rights lagged behind 
its commitments. Despite the arrests of a high ranking fugitive, Goran Hadzic in July 2011, 
Croatia is still having difficulty in handling war crimes accountability. In 2011, the number of 
war crime trials conducted in absentia increased. Despite a plan by the Chief State Attorney to 
revise past convictions given in absentia, in the first eight months of 2011, twenty of the thirty-
three active war crimes trials took place at least partially in absentia.31 In addition, war crimes 
trials continue to be held in regular district courts instead of four courts designed especially for 
war crimes trials. According to Amnesty International, there are 540 war crime cases in 2011 
still at the pre-investigative stage, with an average of eighteen war crime cases being concluded 
each year.32 At this pace, most of those allegedly responsible will never face trial.  
 According to UNHCR estimates, there are 26,388 people that are of concern in Croatia as 
of December 2011. This number is broken down to represent 786 registered refugees, 807 
                                                 
29Commission Staff Working Paper Analytical Report p. 23 
30Commission Staff Working Paper Bosnia and Herzegovina 2011 Progress Report p. 20 
31"Croatia Country Summary." Human Rights Watch. Jan. 2012. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. <http://www.hrw.org/world-
report-2012/world-report-2012-croatia> 
32Amnesty International. New Croatian Government Must Deliver War Crimes Justice.Amnesty International. 23 
Dec. 2011. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. <http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/new-croatian-government-
must-deliver-war-crimes-justice-2011-12-23> 
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asylum seekers, 2,059 internally displaced people (IDPs), 1,720 stateless people, and 21,016 
other persons of concern.33 The number of returnees to Croatia from Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Serbia/Montenegro has decreased every year since 1998. In 2011 there were 305 returns to 
Croatia, down from 538 in 2010.34 In addition, the number of IDPs has decreased at a much 
smaller rate. Below is the number of IDPs since 2007:35 
Table 5.2: Internally Displaced Persons in Croatia (IDPs) 










 According to Human Rights Watch, there have been ongoing delays for government-
sponsored housing programs for returnees. Only 286 applications were approved from June 2010 
to June 2011.36 Also, as of the end of June 2011, 23,568 out of 24,901 pension requests for 
recognition of wartime work in formerly rebel-held areas, had been processed, with only fifty-
seven percent of them being resolved positively. Human Rights Watch argues that this continues 
to compromise the financial security of returnees.37  
 In Serbia, according to both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, little 
progress has been made on human rights issues. Roma continue to suffer from discrimination 
and attacks. For example in March 2011, a Roma boy was repeatedly beaten outside his high 
school. A similar incident occurred in May, when three individuals beat a young Roma adult in a 
                                                 




36"Croatia Country Summary." Human Rights Watch 
37Ibid. 
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Belgrade bus.38 Forced evictions of Romani people also continue across Belgrade. In April 2011, 
thirty eight Romani families were evicted from their informal settlement in Ĉukarica 
municipality. The majority of them were sent back to Serbia where they came from.39 In October 
2011, thirty-six Roma, including seventeen children, were evicted from their homes in Belgrade. 
Five of the families were later relocated in containers, which did not meet international standards 
for adequate housing.40  
 According to UNHCR, Serbia has about 73,608 refugees, one of the largest displaced 
populations in Europe. They have approximately 228,442 IDPs from Kosovo, of whom 97,000 
still need assistance according to an IDP Needs Assessment Survey done by the Serbian 
Commissariat for Refugees and UNHCR in 2011.41 Also, the number of asylum seekers 
registered in Serbia rose dramatically, from 522 in 2010 to 2,134 in 2011.42 This rise is attributed 
to an influx of migrants through Greece, Turkey, and FYROM.  
 In their 2012 country summary, Human Rights Watch noted that BiH again failed to 
implement a 2009 European Court of Human Rights ruling (Sejdic and Finci vs. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina) ordering the country to amend its constitution to eliminate ethnic discrimination in 
the national tri-partite presidency and House of Peoples.43 The court ruled that BiHs constitution 
violated the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by discriminating against leading 
members of the Jewish and Roma communities in political life solely based on their ethnicity. 
                                                 
38"World Report 2012: Serbia." Human Rights Watch. Jan. 2012. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. <http://www.hrw.org/world-
report-2012/serbia> 
39"Serbia Annual Report 2011." Amnesty International. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/serbia/report-2011> 
40 Ibid. 
41"2012 UNHCR Country Operations Profile-Serbia." UNHCR. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48d9f6> 
42 "World Report 2012: Serbia." Human Rights Watch 
43"Country Summary Bosnia and Herzegovina." Human Rights Watch. Jan. 2012. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/bosnia_2012.pdf> 
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On March 15, 2012, BiHs parliament missed a Council of Europe deadline to propose 
constitutional reforms to end ethnic discrimination in the constitution.44  
 Although more Roma children were enrolled in primary and secondary education in 
2011, they still attend school at lower rates than their peers and the ninety-nine percent 
unemployment rate for Roma in 2011 meant that those that completed school have little chance 
of finding work.45 Also, at their seventy-seventh session in August 2010, the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), expressed concern about the continued 
discrimination of Roma in access to adequate housing, health care, employment, social security, 
and education. 46 
 Finally, strategies to support returnees have done little to stop their declining numbers. 
According to UNHCR, only 146 refugees and 177 IDPs returned to their areas of origin in the 
first six months of 2011.47 As of mid 2011, there were 113,365 registered IDPs.48 The 
impediments for returnees according to UNHCR, are the same as in previous years: lack of 
economic opportunity, inadequate housing, and a reluctance to return to areas where residents 
would be an ethnic minority.  
Democracy and Rule of Law as a Whole  
Taking a broad view of the status of democracy and the rule of law in the Western 
Balkans, we see that little progress has been made and in some cases, the situation has gotten 
worse. Every year, Freedom House publishes its Nations in Transit Report. The most recent one 
                                                 
44"Second Class Citizens." Human Rights Watch. 4 Apr. 2012. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://www.hrw.org/node/106194/section/3> p. 3 
45"Country Summary Bosnia and Herzegovina." Human Rights Watch 
46Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Rep. no. A/65/18. United Nations, 2010. 
Web. 15 Mar. 2012. <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G10/459/21/PDF/G1045921.pdf?OpenElement>  p. 25 




was in 2011, which covering twenty-nine countries from Central Europe to Central Asia. Ratings 
are done in seven categories: national democratic process, electoral process, civil society, 
independent media, local democratic governance, judicial framework and independence, and 
corruption.49 The scores are averaged and a final democracy score is given. The ratings are based 
on a scale of one to seven, with one representing the highest and seven the lowest level of 
democratic progress. The democracy score (one to seven), defined the following regime types: 
1.00-2.99-consolidated democracy; 3.00-3.99-semi-consolidated democracy; 4.00-4.99-
transitional or hybrid regimes; 5.00-5.99-semi-consoldated authoritarian regimes; and 6.00-7.00 
consolidated authoritarian regimes.50 
 From 2007 to 2011, both Croatia and Serbia were identified as semi-consolidated 
democracies while Bosnia and Herzegovina was identified as a transitional hybrid regime. A 
semi-consolidated democracy means that the country meets relatively high standards for the 
selection of national leaders but exhibits some weaknesses in their defense of political rights and 
civil liberties. A transitional or hybrid regime means that the country meets only minimum 
standards for the selection of national leaders. Democratic institutions are weak and extensive 
challenges to the protection of political rights and civil liberties exist. Also, the likelihood for a 





                                                 
49Nations in Transit 2011 Methodology. Rep. Freedom House, 2011. Web. 15 Apr. 2012. 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/NIT-2011-Methodology.pdf> p. 11-12 
50Ibid. p. 21-25 
51Ibid. p. 21-25 
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Table 5.3: Freedom House Nations in Transit 2007-2011 Croatia 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Electoral Process 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 
Civil Society 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.50 
Independent Media 4.00 3.75 4.00 4.00 4.00 
National Democratic 
Governance 
3.50 3.25 3.50 3.50 3.50 
Local democratic Governance 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 
Judicial Framework and 
Independence 
4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 
Corruption 4.75 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.25 
Democracy Score 3.75 3.64 3.71 3.71 3.64 
(Compiled from Freedom House- Nations in Transit 2007-2011-Croatia 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit>)  
 
Looking at these scores, we see that the democracy score for Croatia has remained relatively 
stable except in 2011 when it decreased a little bit. The corruption score decreased while 
electoral process and judicial framework and independence scores remained unchanged. 52 The 
scores signify that the EUs policies have not done much to neither help nor hurt Croatia.  
Table 5.4: Freedom House Nations in Transit 2007-2011 Serbia 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Electoral Process 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 
Civil Society 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.50 2.25 
Independent Media 3.50 3.75 3.75 4.00 4.00 
National Democratic 
Governance 
3.75 4.00 4.00 3.75 3.75 
Local democratic Governance 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.50 3.50 
Judicial Framework and 
Independence 
4.25 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 
Corruption 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.25 
Democracy Score 3.68 3.79 3.79 3.71 3.64 
(Compiled from Freedom House- Nations in Transit 2007-2011-Serbia 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit>)  
 
Looking at these results for Serbia, we see the same results as Croatia. The corruption score 
decreased while electoral process and judicial framework and independence score remained 
                                                 
52Peter Dorić. Nations in Transit 2011 Croatia. Rep. Freedom House, 2011. Web. 15 Mar. 2012 p. 163 
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unchanged. From 2010 to 2011, the national democratic governance score remained 
unchanged.53 
Table 5.5: Freedom House Nations in Transit 2007-2011 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Electoral Process 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.25 3.25 
Civil Society 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 
Independent Media 4.00 4.25 4.50 4.50 4.75 
National Democratic 
Governance 
4.75 5.00 5.00 5.25 5.25 
Local democratic Governance 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 
Judicial Framework and 
Independence 
4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.25 
Corruption 4.25 4.25 4.50 4.50 4.50 
Democracy Score 4.04 4.11 4.18 4.25 4.32 
(Compiled from Freedom House- Nations in Transit 2007-2011-Bosnia and Herzegovina 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit>)  
 
BiH received the worst scores, and its democracy score has increased each year since 2007. 
BiH’s received the highest score due to its lack of democratic governance and critical reforms.54  
 According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, Croatia is listed as a 
“flawed democracy”  and defined as “countries that have free and fair elections, even if there are 
problems basic civil liberties will be respected. 55 However, there are significant weaknesses in 
other aspects of democracy, including problems in governance, an underdeveloped political 
culture and low levels of political participation.”56 The index is based on the ratings for sixty 
indicators grouped in five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the 
functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. Each category has a 
rating on a zero to ten scale, and the overall index of democracy is the simple average of the five 
category indexes.57 The higher the number, the higher the democracy index. 
                                                 
53Misha Savić. Nations in Transit 2011 Serbia. Rep. Freedom House, 2011. Web. 15 Mar. 2012 p. 481 
54Jasna Jelisić. Nations in Transit 2011 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Rep. Freedom House, 2011. Web. 15 Mar. 2012 p. 125 
55Democracy Index 2011: Democracy under Stress. Rep. Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011. Web. 15 Apr. 2012 p. 5 
56Ibid. p. 31 
57Ibid. p. 31 
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 Croatia ranks 53 out of 167 countries, with an overall democracy index of 6.73. In the 
respective categories, Croatia scores the highest on the electoral process and the lowest in 
political culture.58 Croatia has a 9.17 in electoral processes and pluralism; 5.71 in functioning of 
government; 5.56 in political participation; 5.00 in political culture; and an 8.24 in civil liberties.  
In comparison with the 2010 index, Croatia has the same rank (53) but a slightly lower score 
(6.81 in 2010 versus 6.73 in 2011).59 
 Serbia is considered a flawed democracy with an index of 6.33 (ranked 64 out of 167). 
Breaking down the score, Serbia has a 9.17 in electoral process and pluralism; 4.64 in 
functioning of government; 6.11 in political participation; 4.38 in political culture; and 7.35 in 
civil liberties.60 In comparison with 2010, Serbia’s index has remained the same though it went 
down one in rank (65 in 2010 to 64 in 2011).61 
 Finally, Bosnia and Herzegovina is considered a hybrid regime, with an index rank score 
of 5.24 (ranked 95 out of 167). Breaking down the score, BiH has a 6.92 in electoral process and 
pluralism; 3.29 in functioning government; 3.33 in political participation; 5.00 in political 
culture; and 7.65 in civil liberties.62 Comparing the 2010 score with 2011, we see that in 2011, 
the index decreased (5.32 in 2010 to 5.24 in 2011).63  
 In summary, the results of our findings show despite the financial assistance the EU has 
given towards the Western Balkans, these countries have a long way to go in improving 
democracy and the rule of law. Conditions have not worsened but they have not improved. They 
have been relatively constant. This is indicated by the numerous independent rankings, reports, 
                                                 
58Ibid. p. 32 
59Ibid. p. 13 
60Ibid. p. 5 
61Ibid. p. 13  
62Ibid. p. 6 
63Ibid. p. 13 
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and opinion polls we looked at. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy 
Index, Croatia and Serbia are listed as a “flawed democracies” and Bosnia and Herzegovina is a 
“hybrid regime.”64 From the start of Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) funding in 2007, their 
rankings have remained relatively the same.  
 Regarding corruption, all three states still have major problems combating it. Though two 
states, Croatia and Serbia received lower scores in 2011 from Transparency International than 
they did in 2010, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s score remained the same. Looking at the scores 
since the IPA was established they have remained relatively constant. 65 Opinion polls indicate 
that the general public believes that corruption is widespread in both government and business.  
 Regarding the protection of minority rights and refugees, we see that little has been done 
regarding the protection of the Roma in all three countries. Also, the programs that tried to 
support returnees and Internally Displaced People (IDPs) have done little to stop their declining 
numbers. The most troubling situation was in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where due to 
inflammatory rhetoric a government was not formed for over a year following their general 
elections in October 2010.66 
 
                                                 
64Democracy Index 2011: Democracy under Stress p. 5-6 
65International Corruption Perceptions Index 2011-2007. Transparency International  
66 "Breakthrough on Bosnian Impasse." Balkan Insight. 
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Chapter 6: Proposals for Strengthening Conditionality and Conclusion 
In this chapter, I will conclude by providing some specific recommendations for improving 
EU conditionality. These are based on expert analysis and collected and summarized here.  
Looking at the results, there are a number of ways the EU can better strengthen their 
conditionality towards the Western Balkans. First, the EU should stand firm on conditionality 
and only allow countries to become members if they are politically and technically ready. The 
EU currently refers to the need to only accept members when they are ready, in their 
Enlargement Strategy Reports. The most recent reference to rigorous conditionality was in the 
2008-2009 Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges. The report stated that “the EU should be 
ready to accelerate their pre-accession preparations, as soon as they meet the necessary 
conditions, and to ensure that the region continues to benefit from the highest level of political 
and economic treatment in line with the SAP.”1 A more explicit reference to strong 
conditionality is found in the 2005 Enlargement Strategy. In it the Commission stated that: 
The EU must remain rigorous in demanding fulfillment of its criteria, but fair in duly 
rewarding progress. Aspirant countries can only proceed from one stage of the process to the 
next once they have met the conditions for that stage. Moreover, the Commission is prepared 
to recommend the suspension of progress in case of a serious and persistent breach of the 
EU’s fundamental principles, or if a country fails to meet essential requirements at any stage. 
Such requirements include cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY).2 
 
Though the EU claims to follow conditionality, they have used enlargement policy as a 
diplomatic tool. For example, in April 2008, the EU decided to sign a Stabilization and 
                                                 
1Communication from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament Enlargement Strategy and Main 
Challenges 2008-2009. Rep. no. COM(2008) 674 Final. European Commission, 5 Nov. 2008. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-
documents/reports_nov_2008/strategy_paper_incl_country_conclu_en.pdf>  p. 8  
2Communication from the Commission 2005 Enlargement Strategy. Rep. no. COM (2005) 561 Final. European 
Commission, 9 Sept. 2005. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0561:FIN:EN:PDF> p. 3 
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Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia even though Serbia did not fulfill its obligation to 
cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The 
signing of the SAA was seen by many experts as an opportunity to influence the 2008 
parliamentary elections to provide a boost for the pro EU parties, amid a polarized political 
climate in Serbia, and in the wake of the Kosovo declaration of independence and its recognition 
by a number of EU member states.3  
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the EU called explicitly for the unification of the police 
forces as a prerequisite for signing a SAA, it weakened its conditionality when faced with a 
strong internal reaction from Bosnian Serbs that threatened to derail the whole association 
process. In the end, the agreement between the two was an accommodation between the different 
internal views in Bosnia and EU, and foresaw the setting-up of some state-level police 
coordination bodies without immediately affecting the autonomy of the two forces.4 
The Balkan people and officials are confused by contradictory statements made by EU 
representatives and vague EU progress reports. For example, Reuter news agency reported in 
October 2008, that France and Germany were trying to block the European Commission from 
setting the date for the end of accession talks with Croatia not because the country did not fulfill 
its obligations, but because Germany and France wanted to wait until all twenty-seven members 
ratified the Lisbon Treaty.5 This occurred despite a pledge from Commission President Jose 
Manuel Barroso to Croatia’s Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, to give Croatia a provisional accession 
schedule. Citizens of the Western Balkans expect the EU to act as a single body and are 
disappointed when European foreign policy is adjusted to the requirements of one 
                                                 
3 Othon Anastasakis. "The EU's Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans: Towards a More Pragmatic 
Approach  p. 374 
4Ibid. p. 374 
5"France, Germany 'Block' Croatia's EU Path." Balkan Insight. 23 Oct. 2008. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. 
<http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/france-germany-block-croatia-s-eu-path> 
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uncompromising state.6 When the EU hesitates on its commitments, it undermines the credibility 
and effectiveness of the EU’s projects and instruments.  
The EU must not make the same mistake in accepting members too early as they did in 
Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. In both cases, their accession was not of the result of an objective 
assessment of their compliance with EU conditionalities, but rather a reflection of wider security 
and political imperatives. For example, negotiations with Bulgaria were to some extent timed to 
provide the Irish Presidency of the Council with a “success” in case the negotiations on the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe could not be finalized on its watch.7 In addition, 
the entanglement of the Romanian and Bulgarian EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) with the rising crisis in Kosovo and the unresolved issue of Turkey’s application 
produced a powerful incentive for the revision of the EU’s enlargement strategy.8 
The enlargement strategy should be based on political consensus from both the EU and the 
Western Balkans. A policy based on broad consensus adds credibility to the enlargement 
process. It helps moderate possible deterioration, such as political crises in some countries and 
helps prepare the population of the region for EU membership.9 In addition to coherence, 
conditionality should be based on country tailored strategies, ensuring that accession does not 
move at the pace of the slowest candidate. Lowering standards in order to increase the pace of 
progress gives the impression that making progress on the accession track is more important to 
EU officials than it is to accession countries.  
                                                 
6Odile Perrot, "Multiple Bilateral Issues: Obstacles to the Thessaloniki Agenda." Accession of the Western Balkans 
to the EU: Evaluating a Process (2010): 14-17. p. 15 
7David Phinnemore. "From Negotiations to Accession: Lessons from the 2007 Enlargement."Perspectives on 
European Politics and Society 10.2 (2009): 240-52.  p. 243 
8Othon Anastasakis. "The EU's Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans: Towards a More Pragmatic 
Approach." p. 161 
9Eduard Kukan. "Is the EU Strategy the Most Adapted Strategy to the Balkan Region?"Accession of the Western 
Balkans to the EU: Evaluating a Process (2010): 36-38. p. 37 
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The EU should use its screening reports to clearly communicate to the government and civil 
society actors in both member and applicant countries, where the enlargement process of a 
particular country stands, how far it has to go, and what benefits it can expect on the way. Clear 
to-do lists and comprehensive lists of priorities with guiding principles for implementation will 
help countries aspiring for EU membership to respond better to the EU’s demands and make it 
easier for civil society to hold their governments accountable.10 The EU should also include a 
date when it believes a candidate country would be ready to join the EU. The date should be used 
as a purely preliminary reference poin. The report should read “based on the current assessment, 
we expect a country to be ready for membership in 2015.” The EU should revise this given year 
with each progress report, moving it up or back if necessary.11 
The Western Balkan population generally still supports the EU’s enlargement efforts. In 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to the 2010 Gallup Balkan Monitor, 69% think that acceding 
to the EU would be a good thing for the country. That figure rose dramatically from 2008, when 
48% responded that EU accession was good for their country.12 In both Croatia and Serbia, 
support for the EU in 2010 decreased with 25% of Croatians and 44% of Serbians believing that 
EU accession would be a good thing compared to 26% of Croatians and 50% of Serbians in 
2009.13  
The EU needs to better inform and motivate citizens of the Western Balkans in the accession 
process. To accomplish this, the EU needs to include and build up civil societies. Civil society 
funding needs to be more independent from government and become mutual partners. Currently, 
                                                 
10Cornelius Adebahr, and Almut Möller. "Chapter IV: Recommendations for Strengthening the Union's 
Neighborhood Policies." Ed. Almut Möller. DGAP Analyse Crossing Borders Rethinking the European Union's 
Neighborhood Policies 2 (2011): 77-84. p. 81 
11 Ibid. p. 81 
12Gallup Balkan Monitor Insights and Perceptions: Voices of the Balkans 2010 Summary of Findings. p.21 
13Ibid. p. 22 
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all IPA funding goes through the national governments. A more independent civil society would 
make them follow their own agenda and their watchdog role could be strengthened.  
In addition, many people involved in the public sector fear losing their jobs when the EU 
requires countries to streamline institutions and improve efficiency, and thus do not feel an 
urgency in supporting or helping implement reforms. Increasing transparency about the process 
of enlargement would clarify what new capacities a country must develop, and could reassure 
public sector employees that their support for reforms will benefit them directly.14 Leaders of the 
opposition political parties would also be interested to know how EU accession conditions might 
help break political machines and reopen electoral competition.  
In this thesis I set out to see if the European Union’s enlargement model had a positive effect 
in helping build up democracy and the rule of law in the Western Balkans. I focused on the 
Component I of Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), which is used to strengthen 
domestic institutions and the rule of law. Within the first component, I looked at the justice and 
home affairs sector within that I assessed whether the measures to address corruption and 
minority rights and refugees have been effective. The three Western Balkan states that were 
chosen were Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were chosen because each 
represented a different stage of accession; they share a geographical footprint, and many 
historical experiences.  
The results indicate that despite the financial assistance the EU has given towards the 
Western Balkans, the countries have a long way to go to improving democracy and the rule of 
law. Conditions have not worsened but they have not improved. They have been relatively 
                                                 
14Policy Brief from Meeting V: Reinforcing EU Conditionality. Issue brief. Woodrow Wilson International Center 
for Scholars, 2011 p. 3 
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constant. However, hope is not lost for the EU’s policy in the Balkans. If the EU strengthens and 
clarifies its conditionality and only accepts members when they are politically and technically 
ready to become EU member states, it will show that the EU is truly committed to enlargement, 
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